Corruption in transition economies has become the very focus of many recent discussions on politics and economics. However, the existing research has not taken full account of the experience of the gradual transition countries, especially China, and the incentives for rent creation in the transition process. Based on existing studies in this field, this paper addresses a new category of corruption in transition economies. In the context of the rent seeking theory, the authors examine what they regard as a unique type of corruption in China—administrative monopoly (AM), and outline its essence, causes, forms, features, the scale of the rent created, and the dissipation of the rent.
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Research Article| June 01 2004
The administrative monopoly in China’s economic transition
Angang Hu *
Center for China Study, Tsinghua University and Chinese Academy of Sciences, Tsinghua University, Room 521, Mingli Building, Beijing 100084, PR China
* Corresponding author. Tel./fax: +86-10-6277-3826. E-mail address:email@example.com (A. Hu).
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Communist and Post-Communist Studies (2004) 37 (2): 265–280.
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Yong Guo, Angang Hu; The administrative monopoly in China’s economic transition. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 1 June 2004; 37 (2): 265–280. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2004.03.005
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