The implicit association test (IAT) is widely used to measure evaluative associations towards groups or the self but is influenced by other traits. Siegel, Dougherty, and Huber (2012, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology ) found that manipulating cognitive control via false feedback (Study 3) changed the degree to which the IAT was related to cognitive control versus evaluative associations. We conducted two replications of this study and a mini meta-analysis. Null-hypothesis tests, meta-analysis, and a small telescope approach demonstrated weak to no support for the original hypotheses. We conclude that the original findings are unreliable and that both the original study and our replications do not provide evidence that manipulating cognitive control affects IAT scores.

Over a hundred prior studies show that reward-related distractors capture attention. It is less clear, however, whether and when reward-related distractors affect performance on tasks that require cognitive control. In this experiment, we examined whether reward-related distractors impair performance during a demanding arithmetic task. Participants (N = 81) solved math problems, while they were exposed to task-irrelevant stimuli that were previously associated with monetary rewards (vs. not). Although we found some evidence for reward learning in the training phase, results from the test phase showed no evidence that reward-related distractors harm cognitive performance. This null effect was invariant across different versions of our task. We examined the results further with Bayesian analyses, which showed positive evidence for the null. Altogether, the present study showed that reward-related distractors did not harm performance on a mental arithmetic task. When considered together with previous studies, the present study suggests that the negative impact of reward-related distractors on cognitive control is not as straightforward as it may seem, and that more research is needed to clarify the circumstances under which reward-related distractors harm cognitive control.

Self-control is assessed using a remarkable array of measures. In a series of five data-sets (overall N = 2,641) and a mini meta-analysis, we explored the association between canonical operationalisations of self-control: The Self-Control Scale and two measures of inhibition-related executive functioning (the Stroop and Flanker paradigms). Overall, Bayesian correlational analyses suggested little-to-no relationship between self-reported self-control and performance on the Stroop and Flanker tasks. The Bayesian meta-analytical summary of all five data-sets further favoured a null relationship between both types of measurement. These results suggest that the field’s most widely used measure of self-reported self-control is uncorrelated with two of the most widely adopted executive functioning measures of self-control. Consequently, theoretical and practical conclusions drawn using one measure (e.g., the Self-Control Scale) cannot be generalised to findings using the other (e.g., the Stroop task). The lack of empirical correlation between measures of self-control do not invalidate either measure, but instead suggest that treatments of the construct of self-control need to pay greater attention to convergent validity among the many measures used to operationalize self-control.