Older adults typically remember more positive than negative information compared to their younger counterparts; a phenomenon referred to as the ‘positivity effect.’ According to the socioemotional selectivity theory (SST), the positivity effect derives from the age-related motivational shift towards attaining emotionally meaningful goals which become more important as the perception of future time becomes more limited. Cognitive control mechanisms are critical in achieving such goals and therefore SST predicts that the positivity effect is associated with preserved cognitive control mechanisms in older adults. In contrast, the aging-brain model suggests that the positivity effect is driven by an age-related decline in the amygdala which is responsible for emotional processing and emotional learning. The aim of the current research was to address whether the age-related positivity effect is associated with cognitive control or impaired emotional processing associated with aging. We included older old adults, younger old adults and younger adults and tested their memory for emotional stimuli, cognitive control and amygdala-dependent fear conditioned responses. Consistent with prior research, older adults, relative to younger adults, demonstrate better memory for positive over negative images. We further found that within a group of older adults, the positivity effect increases as a function of age, such that older old adults demonstrated a greater positivity effect compared to younger older adults. Furthermore, the positivity effect in older old adults was associated with preserved cognitive control, supporting the prediction of SST. Contrary to the prediction of the aging-brain model, participants across all groups demonstrated similar enhanced skin conductance responses to fear conditioned stimuli – responses known to rely on the amygdala. Our results support SST and suggest that the positivity effect in older adults is achieved by the preserved cognitive control mechanisms and is not a reflection of the impaired emotional function associated with age.

The present study investigates interactions between incentive valence and action, which mirror well-known valence-action biases in the emotional domain. In three joystick experiments, incentive valence (win/loss) and action type (approach/avoid) were signaled by distinct orthogonal stimulus features. By combining several design aspects, i.e., the use of bi-directional joystick movements, the inclusion of no-incentive baseline trials, and cue-locked versus target-locked valence and action signals, we tried to bridge between paradigms used in the emotional and motivational domain, and to understand previous, partly inconsistent results. In the first task variant (Experiment 1), we observed performance benefits for compatible mappings (win-approach; loss-avoid) relative to incompatible ones (loss-approach; win-avoid) when valence and action signals were target-locked, consistent with a fairly automatic response activation that can benefit or impair task performance. In contrast, cue-locked valence signals led to response facilitation (relative to a no-incentive baseline) more or less independent of actual valence (win/loss) and action type (approach/avoid), which is reminiscent of general facilitation effects of incentive cues across diverse cognitive tasks. Slight design variations did not change this main result pattern, indicating that it was neither driven by the close proximity between target and performance feedback (Experiment 2), nor by mere temporal coincidence of valence and action signals (Experiment 3), but rather by differences between preparatory (cued) and immediate (non-cued) effects of incentive valence. The present study provides novel insights regarding the nature of valence-action biases in the motivational domain and helps to integrate previous, partly inconsistent findings across domains.

It is well established that emotionally salient stimuli evoke greater visual cortex activation than neutral ones, and can distract attention from competing tasks. Yet less is known about underlying neurobiological processes. As a proxy of population level biased competition, EEG steady-state visual evoked potentials are sensitive to competition effects from salient stimuli. Here we wished to examine whether individual differences in norepinephrine activity play a role in emotionally-biased competition. Our previous research has found robust effects of a common variation in the ADRA2B gene, coding for alpha2B norepinephrine (NE) receptors, on emotional modulation of attention and memory. In the present study, EEG was collected while 87 carriers of the ADRA2B deletion variant and 95 non-carriers (final sample) performed a change detection task in which target gratings (gabor patches) were superimposed directly over angry, happy, and neutral faces. Participants indicated the number of phase changes (0–3) in the target. Overlapping targets and distractors were flickered at a distinct driving frequencies. Relative EEG power for faces vs. targets at the driving frequency served as an index of cortical resources allocated to each of the competing stimuli. Deletion carriers and non-carriers were randomly assigned to Discovery and Replication samples and reliability of results across samples was assessed before the groups were combined for greater power. Overall happy faces evoked higher competition than angry or neutral faces; however, we observed no hypothesized effects of ADRA2B. Increased competition from happy faces was not due to the effect of low-level visual features or individuals low in social anxiety. Our results indicate that emotionally biased competition during sustained attention, while reliably observed in young adults, is not influenced by commonly observed individual differences linked to NE receptor function. They further indicate an overall pattern of affectively-biased competition for happy faces, which we interpret in relation to previously observed boundary conditions.

In this paper, we draw connections between reward processing and cognition by behaviourally testing the implications of neurobiological theories of reward processing on memory. Single-cell neurophysiology in non-human primates and imaging work in humans suggests that the dopaminergic reward system responds to different components of reward: expected value; outcome or prediction error; and uncertainty of reward ( Schultz et al., 2008 ). The literature on both incidental and motivated learning has focused on understanding how expected value and outcome—linked to increased activity in the reward system—lead to consolidation-related memory enhancements. In the current study, we additionally investigate the impact of reward uncertainty on human memory. The contribution of reward uncertainty—the spread of the reward probability distribution irrespective of the magnitude—has not been previously examined. To examine the effects of uncertainty on memory, a word-learning task was introduced, along with a surprise delayed recognition memory test. Using Bayesian model selection, we found evidence only for expected value as a predictor of memory performance. Our findings suggest that reward uncertainty does not enhance memory for individual items. This supports emerging evidence that an effect of uncertainty on memory is only observed in high compared to low risk environments.

Over a hundred prior studies show that reward-related distractors capture attention. It is less clear, however, whether and when reward-related distractors affect performance on tasks that require cognitive control. In this experiment, we examined whether reward-related distractors impair performance during a demanding arithmetic task. Participants (N = 81) solved math problems, while they were exposed to task-irrelevant stimuli that were previously associated with monetary rewards (vs. not). Although we found some evidence for reward learning in the training phase, results from the test phase showed no evidence that reward-related distractors harm cognitive performance. This null effect was invariant across different versions of our task. We examined the results further with Bayesian analyses, which showed positive evidence for the null. Altogether, the present study showed that reward-related distractors did not harm performance on a mental arithmetic task. When considered together with previous studies, the present study suggests that the negative impact of reward-related distractors on cognitive control is not as straightforward as it may seem, and that more research is needed to clarify the circumstances under which reward-related distractors harm cognitive control.

In the present study, we examined the effect of value-directed encoding on recognition memory and how various divided attention tasks at encoding alter value-directed remembering. In the first experiment, participants encoded words that were assigned either high or low point values in multiple study-test phases. The points corresponded to the value the participants could earn by successfully recognizing the words in an upcoming recognition memory task. Importantly, participants were instructed that their goal was to maximize their score in this memory task. The second experiment was modified such that while studying the words participants simultaneously completed a divided attention task (either articulatory suppression or random number generation). The third experiment used a non-verbal tone detection divided attention task (easy or difficult versions). Subjective states of recollection (i.e., “Remember”) and familiarity (i.e., “Know”) were assessed at retrieval in all experiments. In Experiment 1, high value words were recognized more effectively than low value words, and this difference was primarily driven by increases in “Remember” responses with no difference in “Know” responses. In Experiment 2, the pattern of subjective judgment results from the articulatory suppression condition replicated Experiment 1. However, in the random number generation condition, the effect of value on recognition memory was lost. This same pattern of results was found in Experiment 3 which implemented a different variant of the divided attention task. Overall, these data suggest that executive processes are used when encoding valuable information and that value-directed improvements to memory are not merely the result of differential rehearsal.

Positive mood often facilitates cognitive functions. Facilitation is hypothesized to be due to an increase in dopamine occurring in positive mood states. However, facilitation has not been consistently found in studies of cognitive flexibility. This inconsistent relationship may reflect the numerous ways cognitive flexibility is measured. Moreover, there is evidence that the role of dopamine in cognitive flexibility performance depends on the type of measure used. In the current study, we employed a probabilistic two-card reversal learning task (n = 129) and a Stroop-like task switching procedure (n = 188) in a college student population. We used a standardized set of mood videos to induce a positive, negative, or neutral mood state. Negative mood states were included to account for possible effects of arousal on performance, which is seen in both positive and negative mood inductions. Based on current theories of positive mood and cognition, we hypothesized that there would be differences in the effects of a positive mood induction on cognitive flexibility as assessed by task switching and reversal learning tasks. The mood induction successfully induced high levels of amusement and increased valence in the positive mood group and high levels of repulsion and decreased valence in the negative mood group. However, there were no differences in cognitive flexibility across any of the mood groups, as assessed by switch costs in task switching and correct choices after the reversal in reversal learning. Overall, these findings do not support the hypothesis that positive mood improves cognitive flexibility.

We used a Face-in-the-Crowd task to examine whether hostile environments predict enhanced detection of anger, and whether such enhanced cognition occurs for a different negative emotion, sadness, as well. We conducted a well-powered, preregistered study in 100 college students and 100 individuals from a community sample with greater exposure to hostile environments. At the group level, the community sample was less accurate at detecting both angry and sad faces than students; and, only students discriminated anger more accurately than sadness. At the individual level, having experienced more violence did not predict enhanced anger detection accuracy. In general, participants had a lower threshold (i.e., a more liberal criterion) for detecting emotion in response to anger than sadness. And, students had a higher threshold (i.e., a more conservative criterion) for detecting emotion than the community sample in response to both anger and sadness. Overall, these findings contradict our hypothesis that exposure to hostile environments predicts enhanced danger detection. Rather, our community sample was more prone to over-perceiving emotions, consistent with previous studies showing bias in threat-exposed populations. Future work is needed to tease apart the conditions in which people exposed to social danger show enhanced accuracy or bias in their perception of emotions.

Despite the number of documented declines in memory with age, memory for socioemotional information can be preserved into older adulthood. These studies assessed whether memory for character information could be preserved with age, and how the general versus specific nature of the information tested affected outcomes. We hypothesized that memory for general impressions would be preserved with age, but that memory for specific details would be impaired. In two experiments, younger and older adults learned character information about individuals characterized as positive, neutral, or negative. Participants then retrieved general impressions and specific information for each individual. The testing conditions in Experiment 2 discouraged deliberate recall. In Experiment 1, we found that younger performed better than older adults on both general and specific memory measures. Although age differences in memory for specific information persisted in Experiment 2, we found that younger and older adults remembered general impressions to a similar extent when testing conditions encouraged the use of “gut impressions” rather than deliberate retrieval from memory. We conclude that aging affects memory for specific character information, but memory for general impressions can be age-equivalent. Furthermore, there is no evidence for a positivity bias or differences in the effects of valence on memory across the age groups.

Evidence for impaired attention to social stimuli in autism has been mixed. The role of social feedback in shaping attention to other, non-social stimuli that are predictive of such feedback has not been examined in the context of autism. In the present study, participants searched for a color-defined target during a training phase, with the color of the target predicting the emotional reaction of a face that appeared after each trial. Then, participants performed visual search for a shape-defined target while trying to ignore the color of stimuli. On a subset of trials, one of the non-targets was rendered in the color of a former target from training. Autistic traits were measured for each participant using the Autism Quotient (AQ). Our findings replicate robust attentional capture by stimuli learned to predict valenced social feedback. There was no evidence that autistic traits are associated with blunted attention to predictors of social outcomes. Consistent with an emerging body of literature, our findings cast doubt on strong versions of the claim that autistic traits can be explained by a blunted influence of social information on the attention system. We extend these findings to non-social stimuli that predict socially relevant information.

A growing body of literature has demonstrated that motivation influences cognitive processing. The breadth of these effects is extensive and span influences of reward, emotion, and other motivational processes across all cognitive domains. As examples, this scope includes studies of emotional memory, value-based attentional capture, emotion effects on semantic processing, reward-related biases in decision making, and the role of approach/avoidance motivation on cognitive scope. Additionally, other less common forms of motivation–cognition interactions, such as self-referential and motoric processing can also be considered instances of motivated cognition. Here I outline some of the evidence indicating the generality and pervasiveness of these motivation influences on cognition, and introduce the associated ‘research nexus’ at Collabra: Psychology .