Even though the rebels, later turned ‘revolutionaries’, actually had an insignificant role as combatants in the violent downfall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya in 2011, they became involved in acts of war in many parts of the country in what came to resemble a civil war. Their militias flourished thanks to the lucrative financial handouts that governments paid to them. To complicate matters, additional militias sprang up in the absence of any sort of viable state/institutional control on the part of the nascent ‘state’ or an inability to restrict and monopolize the use of force. Therefore, disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and security sector reform have not been possible, and the Libyan case demonstrates the failure to emulate international best practices, thus hindering any state-building. This paper seeks to analyse the Libyan case and provide an approach and framework for dealing with the genuine causes of the current situation in order help put the appropriate disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) policy in place, while simultaneously not ignoring other major, contributing factors. This study suggests that the case of Libya is unique and likely to prove challenging to both established and evolving theoretical approaches to both DDR and SSR. Experiments in the country that have ignored the holistic security sector reform will be examined and its programmes analysed to ascertain whether these have produced any effective state-run structures and mechanisms, norms and procedures, or whether they have only served to reinforce the de facto roles of militias. The article argues that unless the state-building approach is revitalized and national reconciliation made a top priority, Libya’s current debacle and instability is most likely to continue.

This paper analyses the relationship between the elites and the ruling authority in Algeria and the influence of ideology on the development of this relationship through a study of the roles undertaken by the elites from independence to today. The Algerian elites and the ruling authority participated together in building the Algerian state, after which relations between the two parties cooled, so political conditions in Algeria had to follow a trajectory similar to that of other Arab countries. This will transform the concerns of the elites, now merely political decor for legitimatizing the ruling authority within a nation-building strategy, into real agents in the political process, thereby guaranteeing political change and allowing the political map in Algeria to be redrawn. However, concerns have arisen about the distinct role and attitude of the Algerian elites towards issues of political change, especially within the scope of the so-called ‘Arab Spring revolutions’. Therefore, the stages in the process of democratic transition require careful attention to avoid any relapse that may obstruct and destroy the transition, preventing the complete metamorphosis to democracy. That is contingent on the role of the elites who are steering the transition, since they embody the popular will by granting the masses an opportunity to choose the political system that suits them. It is the elites' historical responsibility for leading this difficult stage in the history of a nation which is considering taking its fate into its own hands.

The Palestine National Movement has been engaged in ‘state-building’ in the absence of a state since 1969: in exile (1969–1993) and under Israel's occupation since 1994. Whereas the pre-Oslo ‘state in exile’ was a voluntary act that served several crucial functions including reinforcing Palestinian identity and entity, the post-Oslo state-building has been an obligatory exercise dictated by the terms of the Oslo interim agreements. This paper examines the framework of the post-Oslo state-building and highlights the inherent tensions between the function of the Palestinian Authority as a depository of the anticipated state and the tasks of ending occupation and nation-building. It scrutinizes the international financial role (the post-Oslo international aid program) and argues for a reassessment of international involvement.

This article focuses on the political narrative in Lebanon before and after the Israeli war against Lebanon in 2006. It revolves around the subject of national unity as a sine qua non condition for success for the Lebanese resistance led by Hezbollah. A major consequence of the narrative on national unity is the need to build a modern state and establish a cohesive defence policy. The paper also examines the impact of the war on Lebanon's economy and on its relations with the rest of the world (the USA, France, Syria, Arab countries, and Iran).