The thesis of political Islam’s failure reignites a deep discussion of fundamental questions. At the same time, it opens the door for a discussion of post Islamism as a concept, a term, and a phase. The term “post-Islamism,” like every “post-” term, is undoubtedly characterized by an extremely fluid definition. This leads to certain interpretations expiring without establishing others and to profound transformations occurring within an intellectual and social phenomenon that presages that it will evolve away from its original form. In no circumstance, however, will what comes after resemble what came before. The aspects of the relationship and similarity between the two phases largely remains relative and ambiguous. Although the use of the term “post-Islamism” dates back decades, in particular to the 1990s, it has once again returned to the spotlight, more prominently now than ever, as several Islamist movements are advancing further on the path to accepting democracy, political pluralism, and power-sharing. Several Islamist movements in the Arab and Islamic world today are embracing public and individual freedoms, and advocating a separation of religion and politics. This article examines the concept of post-Islamism, its legitimacy, and credibility as a fundamental shift in Islamist rhetoric and behavior, as well as the causes leading to it, and the conditions, obstacles, and realistic models of this concept or its approximates, both Sunni and Shiite, in the Arab or Muslim world.

This summer, American academia will celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of Samuel Huntington’s most controversial article, later book, on the post-Cold War era. “Clash of Civilizations ? ” was published for the first time in the summer issue of the semi-scholarly journal Foreign Affairs , and was considered the manifesto of US foreign policy after the fall of the Soviet Union. With his publication, Huntington established the foundation of what would become the dominant and unchallenged narrative discourse in world politics during the 1990s and 2000s, especially after the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington. Huntington created the discourse of “Islam is the enemy” and “Islam is the new bogeyman,” to use Stephen Walt’s analogy. Now, twenty-five years after its publication, this article evaluates whether Huntington’s assumption was correct. Does Islam really represent a global threat? And are Muslims the bogeymen of the twenty-first century? The answer, according to this article, is emphatically no !

This paper examines the origin and the relationship between Islamist and non-Islamist political trends in Libya, highlighting the development of the contestation between the two before and after the fall of Gaddafi’s rule. The relationship appears to be that of a contestation between Islamists and liberals but this may be misleading. Islamists are not united but they share an adherence to the establishment of a Muslim society and some form of a khilafa. However, non-Islamists may not easily be identified as “on current.” Indeed, the “current” includes an array of political factions of various dispensations with some not necessarily subscribing to liberal models of democracy. Some belong to pre-Gaddafi-era political parties or were political and human rights’ activists during Gaddafi’s reign. They range from leftist, nationalist, and liberal orientations to populist Arab nationalist forces (including the Ba’th, Pan-Arabists, and others with socialist or communist orientations). When the uprising took place in 2011, the positions each trend took differed before some tactical unity was deemed necessary. When the regime fell, however, differences remerged and became more evident once the transitional structures were put in place. Just before and during the first elections in 2012, Islamists broke ranks with their struggle comrades and fired their cannons at the leaders of the liberal, nationalist, and other elements within the non-Islamist orientations. Islam then became crucial in political expression and rhetoric, especially for Islamist actors. Focusing on the development of this contestation, this paper analyzes the reaction of both Islamist and non-Islamist trends to the policies and tactics adopted by each side in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising and the post-Gaddafi phase. It suggests that although ideology, specifically references to Islam, became crucial in the political contention between Islamists and non-Islamists, the cleavage was not entirely ideological, as both trends considered the Islamic identity of Libya central to their political programs. The interviews with leading representatives of both trends that the author conducted for the purpose of writing this article confirm such a view on the role of ideology in the contestation. As the following discussion indicates, ideology is evidently part and parcel of each sides’ tools, ready to be employed against the other. However, when it does not suit all their purposes, they claim ideology has no role, offering insights into the instrumental and tactical approach to the ongoing contestation of both sides. The article therefore examines the struggle between the two factions as a political competition for the control of resources and positions of power, yet it also argues that ideology and ideas have a role to play, as they constitute the instruments deployed in this struggle, which has, with foreign involvement and backing of different sides, reduced Libya to a “failed state.” In fact although ideological contraposition figures in the contestation, political factionalism and contention in post-2011 were actually fuelled by political factors related to the struggle over access to power and resources, which are instrumental in enabling each side to shape the future state and its political order according to their plans. The struggle between Islamists and non-Islamists may have been the most visible, but it is certainly not the most significant factor in explaining the political dynamics and contention in the country since the fall of Gaddafi.

The surprising rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) and its proclamation as the caliphate on 29 June 2014 imposed an obvious threat to nation-states. The continuous controversy over the nature and applicability of Islamic tenets to governmental institutions has yet to be solved. The possibility and impossibility of an Islamic state in contemporary times is observed by analyzing the very nature of Islam. The concept of an Islamic state is based on the teachings of the Koran and Sunnah, as meant for human welfare and happiness that, according to Muhammad Asad, would automatically preclude the government of such a state from contemplating wars of aggression. This article attempts to analyze the political developments that have taken place since the beginning of the twentieth century and the failure of the Muslims in establishing an Islamic state, despite upholding sharī‘ah principles.

This paper constitutes an attempt to show the large diversity of Arab culture and the various stages through which Arab political thought has developed since the reign of Muhammad Ali in Egypt in the early 19th century up to the present. This panorama of the various schools of political thought shows the impact of the constantly changing geopolitical environment on Arab thinkers. It also shows that essentialist attempts to analyze and grasp the ‘Arab mind’ through a single factor and, namely, through the structure of Muslim theology and laws ( sharia ) are not successful and lead to impoverishing the richness of both Arab culture and political thought.

Through an examination of the different types of relationships between religion and the state, this article argues that the two extremes of this relationship – namely, the case whereby the state exploits religion and the one where it tries to banish it – ultimately lead to the emergence of political Islam as a reaction. Political Islam can be seen as employing religion to gain political power, hence reinforcing the worldly aspects and self-interest of a certain group at the expense of intellectual, ethical and doctrinal considerations. Practically speaking, political Islam has pushed the idea of an Islamic state to suicidal theocratic ends. The main factor behind the ascent of Islamists to political power is the political vacuum resulting from the retreat of the left, added to absolute obstructionism in the political domain. In an attempt to redeem religion and the state in contemporary Arab society and end the struggle between Islamists and secularists, four suggestions are presented: (1) recognition of the right of any political movement to derive its basic ethos from religion, or religious heritage, on condition that this is considered a personal endeavour rather than a religious issue; (2) stressing the civil nature of all parties, whether secular or religious; (3) respecting the civil nature of the state; and (4) abiding by the democratic circulation of power. In sum, a revitalization of the modern state system is inevitable.

Nearly all scholarship on radical political movements suggests that participation in formal politics will lead to moderation. Yet Iraq's Sadrist Movement, the Shi'a Islamist group headed by Muqtada al-Sadr, defies the widespread assumption that political inclusion leads to moderation by giving a group a greater stake in the system. This paper will examine the Sadrist Movement to explore the impact of unstable security conditions on the calculations and actions of political movements. In late 2004, the Sadrist Movement recognized the legitimacy of the Iraqi state, ceased using violence and entered electoral politics. The literature suggests that the Sadrist Movement should have continued to moderate in response to further political and material incentives. However, in 2006 the Sadrists returned to violence and grew increasingly hostile toward democratic politics. Why did the Sadrist Movement reverse course in this manner? This work argues that unstable environments, such as that of post-2003 Iraq, can cause parties to reject the incentives of inclusion within the state political system.

In this compilation of two interviews (one previously unpublished), Hāshim Qāsim speaks with Lebanon's ayatollah Muḥammad Ḥusayn Faḍlallāh – an internationally recognized Muslim scholar, independent thinker, sometimes ‘iconoclast’ faqīh , mufassir and marjaﺀ al-taqlīd whose influence has transcended borders and spanned decades and generations. Faḍlallāh's prolific writing has included not only works on Islamic jurisprudence, politics, thought and tradition, but also a complete exegesis of the Qurﺩān as well as diwans of Islamic poetry. Peer, associate, friend and student of some of the greatest minds and most influential figures of the Shīﺀite world including Khomeini, Abū-l-Qāsim al-Khoei, Muaḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr, and Mūsā al-Ṣadr, Faḍlallāh has mentored and influenced countless Muslims and important personages, including senior members of Ḥizb Allāh, for over half a century. In this interview Faḍlallāh discusses major issues and touches upon many important recurrent themes of his overall discourse from issues faced by Muslims – including the hijab , Zionism and Islamic fundamentalism, to globalization, to world justice.