This article argues that Syria considers Israel as an existential threat and that peace or coexistence between the two sides is impossible in the long run, due to the fact that Syria’s perception of its own history and identity, as an entity that consists of a majority belonging to one ethnicity, (90 percent Arabs), and various religious groups, is in direct conflict with Israel’s perception of its own history (80 percent Jews from various ethnicities). This renders Syrian national security in direct conflict with Israel’s perception of its national security. In addition, both sides are competing over the same sphere of influence which is Greater Syria. This has rendered any reconciliation impossible between the two sides and has led to a continuous struggle with the failure of all efforts to establish peace and end the conflict between them.

This article argues that Syria considers Israel as an existential threat and that peace or coexistence between the two sides is impossible in the long run, due to the fact that Syria’s perception of its own history and identity, as an entity that consists of a majority belonging to one ethnicity, (90 percent Arabs), and various religious groups, is in direct conflict with Israel’s perception of its own history (80 percent Jews from various ethnicities). This renders Syrian national security in direct conflict with Israel’s perception of its national security. In addition, both sides are competing over the same sphere of influence which is Greater Syria. This has rendered any reconciliation impossible between the two sides and has led to a continuous struggle with the failure of all efforts to establish peace and end the conflict between them.

In this post-9/11 age, marked by international terrorism, militant non-state actors have created a world of insecurity, challenging international borders by constructing numerous national security issues. These international demarcation lines have been upheld by international conventions and treaties that have been established over the past decades. However, the fluid movement of people and goods, specifically jihadi militants and weapons, through borders in recent years has created both national and transnational security concerns. Nowhere is this problem more relevant than in the Middle East, and more so at the Libyan–Egyptian border. This research paper assesses the current security and policy problems of the Egyptian–Libyan border from Egypt’s national security perspective and the movement of ISIS militants across this border, which inevitably impacts Egypt’s Eastern border in the Sinai Peninsula. The present actions of international assistance of the United Nations and European Union member states are discussed regarding their negotiation initiatives in Libya. Egypt’s alternative approach is discussed, whereby it is taking charge, whether multi- or unilaterally, of the security predicament by effectively policing this porous border. In effect, this paper analyzes Egypt’s insistence on implementing its traditional notions of security, thereby ensuring it remains in a position of power.

While France, Britain, Qatar and the United States played crucial political and military roles in the alliance of countries backing Libya's ‘spring’ revolution from the beginning, Italy's early stance towards the Libyan revolution was somewhat hesitant and vague. Its initial reticence was due to national security considerations, Italy's calculation of its national interest and the complexity of contemporary international relations. However, as events unfolded, the Italian position became clearer and firmer, such that in time Italy played a leading role that helped the global efforts to rebuild the new contemporary democratic Libya post-Qadhafi. The focus of this study is on the Italian role during the course of the Libyan ‘spring’ revolution, known now as the revolution of 17 February 2011, after the agreed date of its inception. Notwithstanding Rome's initial hesitancy, Italy is considered among the leading actors that participated in the alliance galvanized to act under the terms of UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973. Here the contention is that Italy's full participation in the global alliance that carried out the UN mandates represented a process of transition in the Italian orientation from that of a soft power to that of a hard power as well. Thus, it is argued, when Italy's national security and interests are challenged in a global context, Italy is willing to use both soft and hard power. The findings of this study supported, by and large, the initial expectations concerning the important types of internal and external elements influencing the role of Italy in the Libyan crisis. Thus, Italy's position towards the Libyan revolution of 17 February 2011 may be attributed, among other factors, to its discernment of its national security and national interests in the context of competition in the Mediterranean region and the Middle East as well.