This article explores the relationship between security and democracy in Morocco. It discusses the state’s behavior towards the popular uprisings, how it responds to the social movements demands, and how it manages the security unrests. Throughout, the discussion throws a light on the democratization process of the security sector, in particular, and on the trajectory of democratic transition in the kingdom, in general.

It is now more than four years since the Arab Spring erupted in Tunisia. The results have been rather disappointing, but the events remain potentially among the grand turns of history. The fruition of the Arab Spring has been impeded by a variety of factors cultural, institutional, political, and historical. And in this mix, there are external and internal factors specific to certain countries. In all the countries involved there were lacunae of institutional infrastructure at the public and civil society levels to govern and participate in governance. The cultural traditions of the Arab world in the wake of the spread of fundamentalist Salafist thinking in recent years, created popular perceptibility for the Islamists, who turned out to be either without programmes and experience or extremists with anti-democratic beliefs and a penchant for terror and violence. In addition, there were beneficiary classes tied to the ancient regimes and soldiers accustomed to domination and privileges, who presented structural impediments to change. Despite the great humanitarian disasters in countries like Syria and Libya, the international community proved incapable of decision and indifferent to the suffering of the populace. Still, the Arab Spring needs time to bring about its aspired transformation and modernization and this might carry with it the type of virtual dynamics we have seen in human history.

This article argues that differences in Arab authoritarian regimes were mainly linked to the relationship between the state, the political party in power and the military. By exploring such differences in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria prior to the 2011 crisis, they are explained in the context of the political changes that ensued in the wake of the crisis. How the army played the dual role of instigating change while impeding it at crucial points in the transitional process is described. The mutual lack of autonomy between the state, the party and the military appears to have been a key factor in impeding change, whereas a clear separation of the functions of these institutions was more likely to enable political change to come about.

Despite the introduction of important liberalization measures, Egypt still suffers from serious democratic deficits. Mubarak's inconsistent political reforms, especially since the 2005 legislative elections, have raised many questions and revived the discussion on whether Egypt is heading in a democratic direction. This article contributes to this discussion by investigating the political process under Mubarak's regime and critically analysing the 2005 legislative elections and the 2007 constitutional amendments. It argues that the behaviour of the Egyptian regime since the 2005 elections, particularly with the introduction of the 2007 constitutional amendments, demonstrates its determination to re-consolidate its authoritarian practices.