This paper investigates the policies of both Ankara and Riyadh toward the ongoing crisis between Qatar and the Saudi-led quartet since mid-2017. The crisis has shaken the balance in the region and laid the foundation for new understandings regarding Gulf unity and regional order. On these grounds, it is worth examining the stances of regional actors through different approaches of foreign policy. By using the “three-dimensional” methodology of Kenneth Waltz, this paper analyzes the rationale behind Turkish and Saudi policy toward the Gulf crisis on individual-, state-, and international-based levels since these two countries are among the most influential actors in the region. It argues that Turkish and Saudi approaches can confront each other if the regional developments carry an ideological nature, as in the case of the Gulf crisis.

The Arab Spring initiated a new era in the history of the Middle East and significantly shifted regional dynamics. It profoundly marked the history of the region and affected relations between Middle Eastern countries. Qatar–Saudi Arabia relations have likewise been profoundly impacted by it. This study focuses on how the Arab Spring affected relations between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and on how the regional power struggle and rivalry between Riyadh and Doha were exacerbated during that period when disagreements and clashes escalated and deepened between both countries. It also emphasizes the causes of tensions that emerged during the period of the Arab Spring between both states. Using classical realism as a theoretical framework in approaching the issues at hand, the study begins by outlining the historical background to Qatar–Saudi Arabia relations. It then describes the policies of Qatar and Saudi Arabia towards the Arab Spring and explores the problem areas in their bilateral relations. Finally, the sanctions imposed against Qatar are also discussed.

This paper seeks to assess the nature and scope of open data in government (OPD/open public data) in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Following a qualitative approach, OPD portals of GCC countries are being studied besides seeking inputs from secondary data sources which are relevant in providing theoretical understanding of OPD. The paper shows that OPD in the GCC countries is in its nascent stage and little academic interest has been shown in this area. Future research should highlight the prospects of OPD implementation in the GCC countries given their strategic importance for many reasons. To ascertain that the OPD implementation gathers pace in the GCC countries, governments need to make more robust strategies in terms of physical and research infrastructure for better data analytics and utility. Hitherto, there has been no study covering the significance and implications of OPD in a GCC context; this is the first study to undertake this as its research theme. Furthermore, academic research on OPD in the GCC countries is lacking; the present study seeks to fill this gap.

Military cooperation is one of the most intriguing dimensions of the Qatari-US relationship. It has progressively evolved, driven by a changing geopolitical landscape and security threats in the Middle East. In fact, it has a significant impact on the overall bilateral relationship, especially economic ties. It rests upon four pillars: a bilateral defence agreement, the use of military facilities, arms sales and military-to-military contacts. This paper analyzes the development of the military relationship that exists between Washington and Doha and offers an assessment of the issues that animate it.

When Britain elected to relinquish its colonies east of the Suez Canal, of which the Emirates and Qatar were a part, doubts were many, among observers, as to the possibility of transforming these sheikhdoms into a unified entity. And, even in the eventuality that such should transpire, wagers were that whatever did would not be characterized by any sort of permanence or sustainability. Despite the fact that the native inhabitants of the region were considering a union that would comprise Bahrain and Qatar, in addition to the seven Emirates, the historical legacy of border disputes with regional states and the influence of global powers colluded to facilitate only the inception of the union in 1971 of the seven Emirates, consisting of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Al-Sharjah, Ajman, Ra's al-Khaimah, al-Fuairah and Umm al-Quwain, at a time when Qatar and Bahrain had previously announced their independence. This research paper sheds a light on the extent of what the states of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar have accomplished in the spheres of growth and security since their inception, in addition to the nature of the challenges they confront as well as how their governments dealt with the ‘Arab Spring’. Then, it concludes the discussion with some focal points for reform in the coming years. Furthermore, it is the author's belief that the analysis and conclusions derived herein can be considered to have a connection of applicability to the other Arab countries, especially the oil-producing ones, as they are expressive of a pervasive regional developmental crisis. This research is divided into an introduction, five sections and a conclusion. The first section examines the difficult birth of these two entities at the outset of the 1970s; the second section discusses the fragility of the institutional environment and framework of the two states at this stage; the third section shed some light on the constraints and effects of regional development in the two states; the fourth section analyzes the extent of the overspill and of the ‘Arab Spring’ and its repercussions in these two nations; and the concluding section proposes some recommendations for reform for them in the coming years.

This paper investigates the role played by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in mediating disputes since its creation in 1981 to 2011, the year of the outbreak of the ‘Arab Spring’. It analyzes the contributions of the GCC as a conflict mediator by cross-checking this sub-regional group's institutional structure and policy approach, and presents two major findings. Firstly, the GCC was hardly designed as a conflict mediator, given that the Gulf Arab states created it as a vehicle to respond to intra-Gulf and external security threats and challenges. Secondly, in order to promote its foreign policy independence and boost its regional and global diplomatic profile to ensure its security and survival in the dangerous environment of the Gulf region, it is Qatar that has extensively attempted to mediate conflicts in Lebanon, Yemen and Sudan, with varying degrees of success, under the banners of the GCC and the Arab League. Finally, the paper presents a series of policy recommendations, based on critical insights from Qatari mediation experiences, to enable the GCC to be a proactive dispute mediator.

The countries of the Arab Gulf have witnessed a wave of production of ‘national’ strategies and ‘vision’ initiatives, most of which have been developed by foreign firms and consultants, and many of which were drafted in English. Two examples of these that form the basis of analysis of this article are the Qatar National Vision 2030 (QNV) issued in 2008 and followed up by the Qatar National Developmental Strategy 2011–2016 (QNDS) in 2011. Neither document was subjected to public referendum, and many of those directly involved in Qatar's central planning were unable even to obtain copies until after publication in final form. Both are problematic for reason of vague or undefined terms, lack of concrete goals, as well as any explicit mention of political development in the country. Even more serious is the question of citizenship, where the huge expatriate populations and permanent residence concessions granted on the basis of ownership of real estate threaten to undermine Arab Qatari identity – a situation aggravated further when English was made the official language of instruction in education and a primary language of administration. This latter development also had the effect of dwindling participation of Qatari citizens in the labour force – already low at 14% in 2001 – to a mere 6% in 2009. The article examines four major deficiencies inherent in Qatar in light of the QNV and QNDS: economic–productive, labour force, political and security. Of these, mention of the political deficiency is conspicuously absent from both documents (where there is not a single mention of terms such as ‘democracy’, ‘citizenship’ or ‘elections’) and both the labour force and economic–productive deficiencies are addressed in terms more relevant and favourable to foreign concerns than those of native Qataris. In the final analysis, both the QNV and QNDS are reflective of Qatar's severe demographic anomaly where the number of Qatari citizens was estimated to be only 230,000 out of a total population of 1.64 million in 2010; and official policy in terms of both the labour market and the granting of permanent residence on the basis of unregulated foreign purchases of real estate and investment only serves to perpetuate an already precarious situation. If Qatar is unable to restructure and reform its policies to the benefit of the indigenous Arab population, the matter of identity and the future character of the country threaten to be matters of serious doubt by the end date of the QNV in 2030, if not well before then.