Refugee camp spaces are widely analyzed against their host territories. They are constantly associated with isolation and time–space suspension. However, empirical studies show that camps are not simply islands unto themselves. They can have varying levels of interactions with their surroundings. This paper is concerned with contextualizing the Palestinian refugee camps in the Gaza Strip by examining four inseparable dimensions: spatial, socioeconomic, political and time. It unfolds the historical and contemporary interplay between camp and non-camp areas and shows the similarities and distinctions between them. The findings are based on the analysis and fieldwork of Jabalya refugee camp, the largest in the Gaza Strip. Ethnographic research tools are used in addition to text and historical aerial photo analysis. The paper concludes that in a context such as the Gaza Strip in which the majority of the population are refugees, there is a great deal of connectivity between camps and non-camp areas. The camps are far from being described as enclaves, bare lives, or state of exception. The distinctions between them and their surroundings are very subtle. To a large extent, the camps in the Gaza Strip represent a special case of connectivity to a level that has normalized the territory to become a large enclaved refugee space.

This article discusses the effect of the political division between Fatah and Hamas on the level of generalized trust in Palestine. It argues that the level of trust in Palestinian society has been shaped and influenced by the ongoing political division since 2007. As the level of trust has been declining since 2007, this research suggests that distrust in the political system, the deteriorated healthcare and education services, the high level of unemployment, corruption, and the violation of human rights in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank have led to the decline of the level of generalized trust in society at large. This study uses statistical test results to support the main argument. Data available from 2007, 2011, 2014, and 2017 from the Arab Barometer are used to examine how institutional and contextual factors affect the level of generalized trust in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The article discusses the results and how creating a hybrid society has contributed to lowering the level of trust generally. It seeks to understand the change in social trust among Palestinians over the years of the ongoing division, and examines how the political division, directly or indirectly, has led to the current low level of trust that has left remarkable changes and deep polarization in Palestinian society.

The concept of a political opportunity structure contributes to the analysis of the behaviour of political actors and is one of the current central topics that has importance for political systems at the regional and international levels, as well as for political and social scientific research centres. This study falls within the range of studies on ideological movements and political parties, and the political variables that affect the political system and these movements which lead them to adapt their ideology, by changing their position – from one of rejection to one of acceptance – with regard to participation in parliamentary elections. To achieve their aim of getting into power, ideological movements and political parties can adapt to political changes, influence the structure of political opportunities and exploit ones available to them. This study focuses on the analysis of factors that led to the change in the position of Hamas with regard to democratic practice, from boycotting the first parliamentary elections in 1996 to actively participating in the 2006 elections. It discusses a number of factors: first, the internal organizational factors of the movement; second, the political variables in the Palestinian arena; and third, the internal factors related to the ruling party (Fatah). In light of this, the study principally aims at providing an objective view on the position of Hamas with regard to its political and democratic practice prior to its participation in the Palestinian political system and beyond, using the concept of political opportunities structure. Given that the movement was restricted by its ideology and governed by the political changes that had taken place in the Palestinian political system, it was forced to adapt to the new circumstances that followed the Oslo Treaty by changing its position from opposition and rejection to political participation.

Azmi Bishara assesses Israel in terms of the ancient regional precedent of the crusader state, where a foreign polity maintained its existence through military might and orchestrating intricate pacts with various local powers and Arab princes while sowing internecine dissent among them. The ‘two-state’ solution is, according to the author, one which is doomed to failure due not only to public opinion, political ambiguities and realities on the ground and practical issues, but also to the lack of genuine support. Aside from the concept of a bi-national state once advocated by Hashomer Hatzair in the 1930s, Israel has been unwilling to seriously entertain alternatives. The viable solution, which is unfortunately not taken seriously is the democratic, egalitarian, secular one-state solution—a solution which guarantees equal rights for Jews and Arabs, the right of return. Time, however, according to the author is running out—and the future solutions currently held out by Hamas or Israel are not democratic.