Refugee camp spaces are widely analyzed against their host territories. They are constantly associated with isolation and time–space suspension. However, empirical studies show that camps are not simply islands unto themselves. They can have varying levels of interactions with their surroundings. This paper is concerned with contextualizing the Palestinian refugee camps in the Gaza Strip by examining four inseparable dimensions: spatial, socioeconomic, political and time. It unfolds the historical and contemporary interplay between camp and non-camp areas and shows the similarities and distinctions between them. The findings are based on the analysis and fieldwork of Jabalya refugee camp, the largest in the Gaza Strip. Ethnographic research tools are used in addition to text and historical aerial photo analysis. The paper concludes that in a context such as the Gaza Strip in which the majority of the population are refugees, there is a great deal of connectivity between camps and non-camp areas. The camps are far from being described as enclaves, bare lives, or state of exception. The distinctions between them and their surroundings are very subtle. To a large extent, the camps in the Gaza Strip represent a special case of connectivity to a level that has normalized the territory to become a large enclaved refugee space.

This article addresses the geopolitics of Bab-al-Mandeb in the war on Yemen, which began in 2015 and continues to this day, in the context of a global pandemic. It makes the hypothesis that securing Bab-al-Mandeb is fundamental for US imperialism. For reasons to do with its global hegemony, the United States cannot permit another force, specifically the Houthis of Yemen, to exercise control over Bab-al-Mandeb. Although many reasons could account for the senseless war, the security of Bab-al-Mandeb—a strategic chokepoint of trade and oil flows— over-determinedly (as in an Althusserian concept) explains the war’s continuity.

This paper provides an historical exploration of local governance in Yemen across the past sixty years. It highlights the presence of a strong tradition of local self-rule, self-help, and participation “from below” as well as the presence of a rival, official, political culture upheld by central elites that celebrates centralization and the strong state. Shifts in the predominance of one or the other tendency have coincided with shifts in the political economy of the Yemeni state(s). When it favored the local, central rulers were compelled to give space to local initiatives and Yemen experienced moments of political participation and local development.

In spite of the fact that the linchpin of the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) politico-strategic objectives rests on keeping close connections to a small number of countries in the West and the Middle East, the Emiratis have in recent years strived to forge a somewhat multifaceted relationship with Asia. This is aiming primarily to secure the UAE’s own increasingly growing economic and financial interests in a resurgent East. The UAE seeks to make the most of its current regional standing and advantageous position by serving as a bridgehead of sorts to boost the sprouting presence of the rising Asian powers in the Middle East. The Asians are equally capitalizing on the Emirati looking East in order to vouchsafe their sedimented interests in the region and beyond.

Relations between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Japan since the 1970s have revolved around oil diplomacy. As the UAE diversifies its economy and embraces sustainability, this paper explores how the bilateral relationship has undergone a sustainability turn. It does so by assessing the logic of sustainability and the mutual interests for both parties. It is argued that the sustainability turn reflects what the UAE needs in terms of renewable technologies and skills, coupled with what Japan can provide in return for favorable oil concessions and new markets. Cases of the Japanese government mobilizing various resources and actors to address the UAE’s sustainability needs are examined to gauge how sustainability has been embedded into the bilateral relationship. The sustainability turn provides not just a fresh analytical lens but also it generates insights into policy and a new assemblage of practices and stakeholders that have emerged as part of this increasingly multilayered relationship.

Since the outbreak of the so-called Arab Spring in 2011, the regional system in the Middle East, as well as in the sub-regional system of the Arabian Gulf, has been in flux. Under these new circumstances, the order of the status quo has started to unravel, and a new order is being imposed, accompanied by new regional dynamics and security arrangements. Given their smallness, possession of significant resources, and geostrategic location, most of the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) were always vulnerable, because of either the disparity of their capabilities compared with stronger, larger, and aggressive neighbors or the demographic deficiency and general regional imbalance of power. Traditionally, and to preserve their security and stability, these states seek protection from external powers. This article investigates how small, rich states, such as the GCC countries interact, through the lens of structural realism.