This article combines insights from constructivism with historical analysis to argue that the US military engagement in the Gulf, beginning in the 1980s, was primarily driven by the changed roles of two actors: Iran after the Islamic Revolution and the United States attempting to regain its role as a global superpower following the Vietnam War. It argues that the year 1979 constitutes what constructivists deem a “critical juncture,” in which America’s response to three events—the Iranian Revolution/hostage crisis; the siege of Mecca’s Grand Mosque; and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—helped to redefine the Gulf’s security architecture and made the region more insecure. It ends with a close examination of US participation in the Iran–Iraq War and the long-term implications of the Carter Doctrine’s changing logic.

Iran’s nuclear issue is considered one of the factors that has shaped the regional dynamic in the Arab Gulf sub-region because it is a major factor that might affect the perception of the other side players in the region, international, and regional actors. This matter represents a challenge to the security of the Gulf States. This started to change after the signing of the nuclear deal known as the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” (JCPOA), but then, upon the withdrawal of the Trump administration from this agreement in May 2018, regional alignments began to be reformed. It is within this context that this article tries to answer the following question: How does the American withdrawal from the JCPOA affect the stability in the region and change the stand of the Gulf countries and other regional states? This study is based on the following hypotheses. The withdrawal of the American administration from the nuclear deal, and its imposition of a “maximum pressure” policy, represented a turning point in the vision of the region and has again cast the shadow of the Cold War over the Gulf area. The American withdrawal from the nuclear deal is an independent variable, while the regional security system and the policy of the Gulf States toward this deal is the dependent variable.

This study presents Arab perspectives on changes in Turkish policy in the Middle East from 2010 until 2020. It examines how Arab countries perceive changes in Turkish regional policy after the 2010–11 uprisings. Unlike Western and Turkish literature that has highlighted identity–security combinations behind changes in Turkish regional policy, this study argues that the Arabic research literature provides a different perspective. Based on a foreign policy analysis concept of operational milieu, this study argues that Arab countries negatively perceive the changes in Turkish policy due to structural transformations in the region during and after the uprisings that paved the way for the reemergence of psychological barriers between both sides.

When Libyan youth took to the streets in a populist uprising in 2011, which became known as the 17 February 2011 revolution, many Libyans thought they were on the verge of removing one of the most vicious dictators of the twentieth century, Muammar Gaddafi, and building a new democratic state. Gaddafi responded forcefully, hoping to eliminate the movement in its infancy. But clashes between Gaddafi’s forces and those who took to streets soon turned into a civil war, during which Libyan society was split into two major groups: one supporting the uprising, the other the regime. In addition to armed conflict, these warring groups regarded each other with contempt, generated slander, and accused each other of betrayal, using words and phrases in a discourse of hate speech. This vocabulary of hate manifested in demonstrations and social media. Eight months later Gaddafi was dead, and the political system he built over four decades collapsed. But the war did not stop: yesterday’s allies became enemies, competing for political and economic gains. The number of contesting groups expanded as different clans, tribes, and cities joined the fray for personal gains. Strategies and techniques first used during the Libyan uprising were applied in the civil war, and are still manifest today. Every militia has a Facebook page, owns a television station, or has access to one. These media have been widely used to spread hate speech and to widen the rift between neighbors, creating refugees and internally displaced people. At least five cities became ghost towns during the uprising. When the concept of subculture first appeared in the sociological literature, it referred to members of a group that behaved according to a set of values and norms that deviated from those of mainstream society. Reviewing the language of militia members and their supporters that is articulated in social media or on television, it becomes obvious that such language has devolved into hate speech, creating social fragmentation among Libyans. This language has created a new set of values and norms in Libya that are different from preexisting mainstream Libyan culture. The new language has created a subculture of hate, which serves to sustain and accelerate continuing divisions within Libya, while further fragmenting the social fabric of the country.

The evolution of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has been one of slow progression and resistance to identity unification. Although historical legacies and common threats have brought the GCC countries together, yet the GCC faces some challenges in its aim of unification. This paper seeks to answer the following question: What are the structural and political challenges that impede the process of forming a unified regional Gulf identity (RGI)? The paper will tackle the historical aspect of the GCC and the challenges that faces the establishment of an RGI.

This paper uses a model of governance in higher education, called the political model, that explains the role of universities as agencies of control and socialization, with a resulting repercussion on the quality of education. It compares this model with common models such as the academic, Napoleonic, market-oriented and managerial. It undertakes a review of ten published cases studies, each dealing with the oldest public universities in ten Arab countries, using a historical approach, from their inception until 2016. Among the ten public universities, nine fall into the category of the political model, while the tenth represents the Napoleonic model. The discussion opens the field for further research.