This article provides an overview of the issues addressed in a series of papers on the general theme of ‘religion and the state in the Arab world’ published in Contemporary Arab Affairs over the past 12 months. The papers were initially presented at a conference convened by the Center for Arab Unity Studies and the Swedish Alexandria Institute, held in Hamamaat, Tunisia, in November 2012. Further to his own paper on the topic (published in issue 6(4) in this journal) here Abdelilah Belkeziz identifies the purpose of the whole exercise, namely to explore a range of different perspectives on the theme. He positions these perspectives on a spectrum between two extremes: at one, he contends, the case for separation between religion and state verges on hostility to religion itself; and at the other, an exclusivist version of Islam is accorded primacy over all other considerations in the running of a state and thence political discourse. He discusses the dangers inherent in both extremes and makes the case for a model of secularism that accords space to both religion and politics in the national project.

Through an examination of the different types of relationships between religion and the state, this article argues that the two extremes of this relationship – namely, the case whereby the state exploits religion and the one where it tries to banish it – ultimately lead to the emergence of political Islam as a reaction. Political Islam can be seen as employing religion to gain political power, hence reinforcing the worldly aspects and self-interest of a certain group at the expense of intellectual, ethical and doctrinal considerations. Practically speaking, political Islam has pushed the idea of an Islamic state to suicidal theocratic ends. The main factor behind the ascent of Islamists to political power is the political vacuum resulting from the retreat of the left, added to absolute obstructionism in the political domain. In an attempt to redeem religion and the state in contemporary Arab society and end the struggle between Islamists and secularists, four suggestions are presented: (1) recognition of the right of any political movement to derive its basic ethos from religion, or religious heritage, on condition that this is considered a personal endeavour rather than a religious issue; (2) stressing the civil nature of all parties, whether secular or religious; (3) respecting the civil nature of the state; and (4) abiding by the democratic circulation of power. In sum, a revitalization of the modern state system is inevitable.

This article, originally delivered in the Fall of 2011 at a seminar held in Beirut at the Centre for Arab Unity Studies, examines the 2011 amendments to the Moroccan Constitution in light of the historical background. The tumultuous events of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ brought new urgency to the issue of constitutional reforms that had been broached initially on the accession of Muhammad VI to the throne in 1999. Since independence, Moroccan political society has typically been vibrant, democratic and home to numerous political parties of various orientations and, since the 1970s, has witnessed calls by various sides for constitutional reforms as well as for the institution of a constitutional or parliamentary monarchy. On 9 March 2011 Muhammad VI gave a momentous address subjecting the issue of royal authority to public deliberations. This topic had previously ranked as one of the few unapproachable taboos of the political scene. A vital driving force in the process of constitutional reform has been the youthful February 20 Movement that was instrumental in the mobilization of millions of Moroccans and led to submitting the new draft Constitution to popular referendum and its ratification on 1 July 2011. Unlike other Arab countries, Morocco's functioning democracy, its well-established political parties and the fact that the issue of constitutional reforms had already been on the table meant that when Moroccans descended into the streets they had a set of clearly defined demands – demands that were also less drastic than those being made in other countries. Yet while Moroccan politics have been highly developed and articulate since the 1940s, the events of the Arab Spring provided the necessary shock and catalyst to transform relative complacency into action. The dense topography of mature political parties and organizations in Morocco factored in two ways: first, it permitted a stable environment for democratic transition, which was not new as a concept; and in a somewhat less positive regard, the compromises and concessions to numerous sides dictated by Moroccan political pluralism led – in the drafting of the amended Constitution – to a document of somewhat indistinct character. The King's authority, in particular, is not so limited as a contemporary parliamentary monarchy and he retains a distinct set of powers, particularly under the aegis of his role as ‘Commander of the Faithful’ (Amir al-Mu'minin). Nevertheless, there have been significant changes and this article examines the nature of these, their genesis and links to various political trends and parties. The uniqueness of the Moroccan model is demonstrated, though other Arab countries, notably Jordan, may follow a similar path.