The Nakba, or loss of Palestine in 1948 to the Zionists, led to the expulsion of most of the Palestinian people from their homeland to neighboring countries and all around the world. This was a severe blow for the Palestinians, and it was expected that their identity would whither, and this may have been the case had it not been for the memories they kept from the pre-Nakba and Nakba periods. These memories became so important that up to the present they act as a pivot for Palestinian identity during the diaspora. This article argues that these memories still bind the Palestinian people together and give them a sense of common and national identity.

This article argues that the Lebanese Civil War (1975–90) was in essence a terror of state directed by mercantile economic and political elites (the comprador class) controlling the Lebanese state and society against the middle and poorer classes (the working class). The aim of this terror or organized violence was to subdue the subordinate classes, which in the late 1960s and early 1970s rebelled against the confessional system that operated for the benefit of the comprador class. The rebellion was expressed by members of the working-class joining cross-confessional nationalist and leftist parties. Hence, violence was aimed at reestablishing the confessional order as a means to restore a hegemonic system that served the interests of the comprador class at a time when this class was rehabilitating its economic role by resurrecting the financial system, which had received a severe blow in the late 1960s. It effected this rehabilitation through the Taif Agreement signed between Lebanese parliamentarians in 1989, under the auspices of Syria, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, to favor the new mercantile elite led by Rafiq Hariri.

This article explores the differences between two North African military regimes—Egypt and Algeria—which have been selected due to the continuity of military dominance of the political systems. Still, variations have marked their political development. In particular, the Algerian army’s approach to civilian institutions changed after a civilian president was chosen in 1999. This was not the case in Egypt after the demise of the Hosni Mubarak regime of 2011. Other important variations are to be found in the way power has been distributed among the military apparatuses themselves. In the case of Egypt, a principle of collegiality has been generally preserved within a body, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which is absent in the case of Algeria, where conflicts between military opposed factions are more likely to arise in case of crisis. How differences generally impact the stability of military rule in these two cases is the main contribution of this paper.

The fiercely waged, century-long conflict on the ground of historic Palestine between the Jews, who from the mid-nineteenth century have mainly immigrated from Europe, and the Arab Palestinians, who live there—and have been living there for centuries/thousands of years—primarily started in the educational field. With the establishment of the Technion Institute in 1912, the Political Zionist movement started to develop a higher education system (HES) that could deliver the human capital needed for the building of a prosperous state, one built on the occupation and expropriation of Palestinian land and material property, on the expulsion of the people who lived there, on a system of apartheid, and, at long last, on the denial and destruction of the Palestinian identity. It was only sixty years later that a Palestinian response in the field of higher education was in a position to start with the establishment of Hebron University in 1971, followed by over fifty other Palestinian higher education institutes (HEIs). Despite current numerical parity in the population of around 6.5 million each ( The New Arab 2018 ) and the number of HEIs (over fifty each) on the ground of historic Palestine, a devastating multi-sectorial power discrepancy exists in favor of the visions of Political Zionism. The power discrepancy and the irreconcilable narratives developed on both sides render peaceful compromises impossible. Through bibliographic research, this paper provides an outsider’s general snapshot of the current state of higher education in Palestine in order to explore its relation to conflict narratives, to power gap, and to major political events. It presents ideas for an intra-Palestinian, just as a regional and a global, discourse on how the still weak Palestinian HES in the Occupied Palestinian Territory could be improved to further strengthen Palestinian economic and scientific progress. It reflects on how to expand into a pan-Palestinian HES that, in addition, targets Palestinian refugees and diaspora Palestinians from all over the world, as well as Palestinians living in Israel. Beyond this demographic expansion, this essay suggests an academic engagement with the strengthening of historic Palestinian identity and the restitution of its cultural Druze and Jewish components, which were lost during the last century of conflict. This strengthened renewed multi-religious (now multilingual) Palestinian identity can also offer a long-term perspective for a peaceful solution, a perspective which cannot be offered by the exclusive Political Zionism.

This paper analyzes the complex processes that have been shaping the increased involvement of Bahraini women in politics, especially their share in elected political offices as MPs. Looking back at the unprecedented rise of female MPs in electoral polls in 2018, this research examines the last two decades of female progress in politics and looks in depth at the contributing factors. Using the initial factors established through a literature review, it examines their relevance in the Bahraini political environment, and establishes additional factors peculiar to the kingdom. The role of women is interwoven with political liberalization reforms in the first decade of the twenty-first century, but it was also shaped by the current events, namely, the popular uprising of 2011. The uprising was ultimately contained; yet, the authoritarian upgrading that followed paradoxically created opportunities for greater women’s engagement in electoral politics. The case of Bahrain sheds light on how sectarianism, popular uprisings, and authoritarianism affect women’s position in electoral politics in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which includes the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. In 2017, Lebanon officially joined this initiative, and thus China will be present on the western shores of Asia. This paper examines Lebanese–Chinese relations and Chinese direct investment in Lebanon. It explores the dilemma of Chinese investment in Lebanon in light of its troubled security, political, and economic situation. The study relies on a qualitative descriptive analysis to address the status of Chinese investment in Lebanon and the consequences of this partnership.

When Libyan youth took to the streets in a populist uprising in 2011, which became known as the 17 February 2011 revolution, many Libyans thought they were on the verge of removing one of the most vicious dictators of the twentieth century, Muammar Gaddafi, and building a new democratic state. Gaddafi responded forcefully, hoping to eliminate the movement in its infancy. But clashes between Gaddafi’s forces and those who took to streets soon turned into a civil war, during which Libyan society was split into two major groups: one supporting the uprising, the other the regime. In addition to armed conflict, these warring groups regarded each other with contempt, generated slander, and accused each other of betrayal, using words and phrases in a discourse of hate speech. This vocabulary of hate manifested in demonstrations and social media. Eight months later Gaddafi was dead, and the political system he built over four decades collapsed. But the war did not stop: yesterday’s allies became enemies, competing for political and economic gains. The number of contesting groups expanded as different clans, tribes, and cities joined the fray for personal gains. Strategies and techniques first used during the Libyan uprising were applied in the civil war, and are still manifest today. Every militia has a Facebook page, owns a television station, or has access to one. These media have been widely used to spread hate speech and to widen the rift between neighbors, creating refugees and internally displaced people. At least five cities became ghost towns during the uprising. When the concept of subculture first appeared in the sociological literature, it referred to members of a group that behaved according to a set of values and norms that deviated from those of mainstream society. Reviewing the language of militia members and their supporters that is articulated in social media or on television, it becomes obvious that such language has devolved into hate speech, creating social fragmentation among Libyans. This language has created a new set of values and norms in Libya that are different from preexisting mainstream Libyan culture. The new language has created a subculture of hate, which serves to sustain and accelerate continuing divisions within Libya, while further fragmenting the social fabric of the country.

The evolution of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has been one of slow progression and resistance to identity unification. Although historical legacies and common threats have brought the GCC countries together, yet the GCC faces some challenges in its aim of unification. This paper seeks to answer the following question: What are the structural and political challenges that impede the process of forming a unified regional Gulf identity (RGI)? The paper will tackle the historical aspect of the GCC and the challenges that faces the establishment of an RGI.