Egyptian economic reforms have been an on-going process since the Egyptian government adopted liberal market reforms in 1991 (Kienle 2001, 2004), influenced by a number of internal socio-economic factors, including growing levels of poverty, heightened inflation, high levels of corruption and rising levels of unemployment, in particular among new university graduates. These factors were exerting heavy pressure on a highly bureaucratic and inefficient state (Bayat 1997). However, the ensuing economic reforms resulted in tightened fiscal and monetary polices, and a subsequent increased and heightened socio-economic crisis in Egypt, which the Egyptian government attempted to control by imposing increasingly authoritarian measures, with political de-liberalization evident in both urban and rural areas (Kienle 2001). This led, at the turn of the millennium, to a period of failed economic reforms and increased levels of authoritarianism, which coincided with the political rise of the president's son, Gamal Mubarak, whose economic and business credentials have led to optimism concerning the possibility of future reform and change in Egypt. This paper examines the electoral promises made by Hosni Mubarak in the 2005 presidential elections and the ensuing economic and political implications for the political succession in Egypt, leading to conclusions about the future processes of economic and political reform in Egypt and the impact upon them of the political succession

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