Given several possible strategic scenarios for East Asia, I argue that the region is likely to be divided by China’s growing power and the American presence along with its allies. The bipolar system in Asia will be relatively stable, however, because of conventional military balance, nuclear deterrence, and economic interdependence.

This article assesses Britain's contemporary relationship with Afghanistan, its goals and interests there, and its possible post-2014 role. It is argued that Britain might continue to play a limited but non-negligible military, intelligence, fiscal, and diplomatic role, even as British policymakers are increasingly bound by fiscal and domestic political constraints.

In responding to China’s rise, the best strategy for Australia involves a combination of accommodation and “soft balancing.” The viability of this strategy is related to the extent to which U.S.-China relations are cooperative or conflictual. Recent Australian governments have been successful in implementing this preferred strategy.

This essay examines how China’s “harmonious world” foreign policy has unintentionally created opportunities for citizens to challenge elite discussions of foreign policy. Although they are relative outsiders, the essay argues that citizen intellectuals are a growing influence as a source of ideas about China’s future—and the world’s.

Cambodia is pivotal to China's strategies to project greater influence in Southeast Asia, buffer longstanding rivals, and potentially tame America's hegemony. China's transformation from regional backwater into influential global actor raises concerns for many countries. As expected, the rise of a powerful regional player makes traditional hegemonic countries anxious.

Since the collapse of the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework in 2002, the Bush administration has failed to restrain North Korea's nuclear weapons ambitions, principally because of the constraints of highly idealized convictions. Resolution of the Korean nuclear crisis now depends on U.S. initiative beyond the boundaries of these predispositions and beyond the terms of the nuclear crisis itself.