North Korea’s asymmetric provocations over the last decades can be classified into two periods: tactical provocations at sea in 1970–1990 and strategic (nuclear) provocations in 2000–2020. What is the logic underlying the North Korean imbroglio? And how does the former period differ from the latter? The first set of provocations was intended to shift the threat imbalance caused by a widening gap in conventional military capabilities into a balance of insecurity, where the weaker North Korean side faced South Korea and the combined ROK–US forces. The second set was intended to shift the balance of insecurity into an imbalance of terror while ensuring that only Pyongyang would be armed with nuclear weapons in the area. The “gray zone” discourse of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (rather than North Korea) ended up bolstering North Korea’s nuclear program, while South Korea intensified only its conventional weapons program.

Efforts to denuclearize North Korea continue, but it is highly doubtful whether this goal will be reached. An often-expressed fear of a nuclear-armed North Korea is that it might use this capability to coerce reunification with the South on its terms. Though its leaders often speak of the desire for reunification, North Korea will not and could not pursue a successful nuclear coercion strategy because it carries an inordinate amount of risk, even for Pyongyang, which raises serious doubts about the credibility of its nuclear threats, the possibility of success, and the likelihood of pursuing such a strategy in the first place. And even if North Korea were to succeed, its efforts to integrate the South Korean economy would be a disaster, leading to the end of the North Korean regime.

This paper examines the determinants of North Korea’s foreign policymaking to show why denuclearization efforts continue to fail to curb, let alone end, its nuclear weapons program. Two determinants, namely South Korea’s existential threat and North Korea’s juche ideology, are explored to conclude that “nuclear North Korea” is a natural and non-negotiable manifestation of its foreign policymaking.

Kim Jong Un further consolidated his leadership position at the Seventh Congress of the Workers’ Party in May, the first congress since 1980. Pyongyang conducted two nuclear tests and made advances in missile delivery, eliciting strong sanctions resolutions from the UN Security Council, first in March and again in November.

The North Korean state under a young and unproven leader faces severe challenges. The regime will not change because of a leadership transition or because of the West’s hope of reform. It could crack because its ideology is at odds with the country’s incremental societal change.

North Korea upgraded its nuclear and military power and grew its economy slightly, thereby realizing Kim Jong Un’s byungjin line. It also attempted to open new external fronts and to coerce the South to cooperate on its terms, but failed. Instead, it retreated into a repaired relationship with China.

In 2014, North Korea neither overcame its isolation due to its nuclear weapons and hostile geostrategic posture nor reformed its economy. Kim Jong Un learned on the job, consolidated his leadership, avoided military risk, and opened new channels to South Korea, Japan, and Russia to reduce dependence on China.

India’s Agni-V missile test of April 2012 opens new questions as to India’s intentions. This article investigates three principal bureaucratic determinants of Indian military nuclear policy. Greater control over policymaking is required from the Prime Minister’s Office to resolve governance questions surrounding India’s nuclear policy.

The North killed 50 South Koreans in two audacious strikes, revved up its nuclear programs, and prepared for a third generation of Kim family rule. At the same time, a tight embrace of China still means hardship and hunger for millions of North Koreans.

Following North Korea's second nuclear test, the U.N. Security Council tightened sanctions. However, North Korea has tilted its relations toward partners uninterested in such measures. Since 2005, it has retreated from economic reform, most obviously in the 2009 confiscatory currency reform. These developments raise doubts about North Korea's interest in engagement.

During the first half of 2009, North Korea's relations with South Korea remained frozen, and its second nuclear test angered the entire international community. Beginning in August, the regime adopted a softer foreign policy line, while insisting that it would never give up its nuclear weapons.

Russia had two objectives in its relationship with North Korea. One was denuclearization and the other was to promote influence on the Korean Peninsula to balance the U.S. and Japan. Denuclearization has failed, and Russia will adjust to a nuclear North Korea to further its second aim.

In 2008, North-South relations worsened, food shortages re-emerged, and the Six Party process yielded an interim agreement. The U.S. dropped North Korea from the terrorism list but nuclear verification issues remained contentious. Kim Jong-il reportedly suffered a stroke in August, casting uncertainty over all aspects of politics and policy.

India took important steps in 2006 to develop its economy and improve its standing abroad. Strengthening its strategic partnership with the United States, while at the same time maintaining positive relations with China, was a particularly important achievement. Increased attention to energy security has driven India to reach out to countries well beyond its borders. For the first time in India's history, New Delhi appears comfortable using the military and diplomatic tools that great powers have used throughout history.