In May 2018 the Malaysian governing coalition Pakatan Harapan (PH) lost in national elections for the first time since independence. But the subsequent reform process came to a sudden halt in February 2020. During transitions, unpredictability and risks for political actors are higher, and political conditions are extremely volatile. Multiparty coalitions such as PH have trouble sustaining the cohesion that was instrumental in their electoral victory. The highly polarized environment and the differing strategic calculations of PH coalition partners after the elections prompted the early downfall of the government. At the same time, the opposition, weakened shortly after the transitional elections, increased its cohesiveness and mobilized its supporters against the government in an environment of deep ethnoreligious cleavages. This paper traces the reform successes and failures of the PH government as well as the reconsolidation and strengthening of the new opposition, up to the emergence of the new Perikatan Nasional government.

This article deals with the scandals that engulfed South Korea’s president, Park Geun-hye, in 2016–17 and the role of popular protest in how she, her confidante, and associated officials and business leaders were pursued, prosecuted, and jailed. The South Korean experience is located in a framework of integrity institutions and the 1986 exemplar of “people power” in the Philippines.

Regime type—from authoritarian to democratic—is an important factor in determining the politics of aging and can explain why Singapore has embraced a “Confucian welfare state” model that emphasizes society’s responsibility, while Taiwan has gone from a similar system to a social welfare state more reminiscent of European countries.

To what extent can political marketing narrow the legitimacy gap for a hybrid regime? This article examines this question through the case of Macao (2009–14). It finds that political marketing is insufficient to compensate for lack of democratic reform and may easily backfire to expose the problem of a structural legitimacy deficit.

This article argues that Myanmar is experiencing the beginning of a protracted transition, in which the military, the opposition, and the country’s civil society are renegotiating political space. The protracted transition might take decades, and opposition forces and civil society will face an uphill struggle to fully liberalize the regime.

The political compromise and cooperation established in 2014 between Prime Minister Hun Sen’s long-ruling Cambodian People’s Party and opposition leader Sam Rainsy’s Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) continued into 2015, highlighted by electoral reforms in March. However, by mid-year, CNRP criticism of Hun Sen led to a crackdown and the self-imposed exile of Rainsy and other high-ranking members of the opposition.

In 2015, Mongolia continued to realize some of its significant economic and democratic potential. At the same time, it faced notable economic hurdles, some of its own making and some created externally in its tough immediate neighborhood.

We introduce the concept of a “credibility gap” to explain why the Workers’ Party has been more successful than other opposition political parties in recent elections in Singapore. We argue that opposition parties need to overcome a credible commitment problem with the electorate in order to win against hegemonic parties.

This study argues that well organized labor movements and increasing labor mobilization played a crucial role in the democratic transitions in Indonesia in 1998 and the Philippines in 1986. In contrast, the presence of less active and less organized labor unions in Malaysia, Myanmar, and Singapore appears to be an important reason for the durability of authoritarianism in those countries.

Ten years after independence, 2012 proved a critical year for Timor-Leste, with three rounds of national elections, and the formation of a new government to take the country beyond the 13-year era of international peacekeeping. As the year closed, both the United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste and the Australian military-led International Stabilization Force formally concluded operations.

Cambodia in 2012 mourned the death of its revered former King Norodom Sihanouk. The government was criticized for land conflicts and the deterioration of political liberties. Otherwise, the country enjoyed strong economic growth and basked in the international spotlight as Association of Southeast Asian Nations chair. Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party further consolidated its power, sidelining opposition parties and coopting disgruntled workers and farmers.

This article conceptualizes the multifaceted concept of national identity in Taiwan. The prevailing measures on national identity were ubiquitous, one-dimensional, and categorical, forcing people to choose between being Taiwanese and being Chinese or opting for independence or unification. Conceptual haziness leaves us ill equipped to examine the essence of Taiwan’s identity politics. Hence, this article goes beyond national identity to explore the dimensionality that underlies its nature.

China's new religious policy expands the institutional autonomy of religious organizations, limits the power of religious affairs bureaus, and provides for administrative appeal, judicial challenge, and sanctioning errant officials. As such, it is an effort of the Chinese government to integrate religious policy with its systemic socioeconomic and political reforms.

In Nepal, the twice-postponed elections for the Constituent Assembly were successfully held in April 2008. The Maoists, who obtained a plurality of seats, took office at the head of a multi-party coalition following the formal abolition of the monarchy. Yet, fundamental issues still remained unresolved, including integrating the guerilla forces into the national army. In Bhutan, elections for the lower house were won decisively by the party led by Jigme Thinley, and the country's new Constitution was promulgated.

Democratization studies now highlight potentially derailing problems such as warlike nationalism and violent ethnic conflict. In Myanmar, where ethnic tension runs deep, the risks are especially great. Political reformers should work within the framework of the military junta's planned 2010 general election, and pay close attention to nation building.

Analysis of Myanmar's official and unofficial trade suggests that the material bases of independent political power have weakened. Concentration of commercial influence in conjunction with Western trade sanctions has curtailed the potential spread of an independent trading class. Declining trade exposure has also diluted the political power of agriculture, Burma's traditional mainstay, to sustain challenges to the regime.

As a result of normalization of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972, Japan cut off its diplomatic ties with the Republic of China (Taiwan). What followed was nearly two decades of diplomatic tepidity between Tokyo and Taipei. Since the 1990s, however, Japan and Taiwan have been rapidly approaching each other again. This commingling process, which has elevated their relations to an ““unofficial-in-name-only”” status, is the result of three mutually reinforcing factors: re-imagination of colonial ties, sharing of a democratic identity, and the permeating of popular culture.

This study takes a disaggregated approach to the analysis of recent anti-American sentiments in Korea. It examines how the political changes entailed in the processes of democratization and democratic consolidation in the arenas of civil society, political society, and the state have diversely affected anti-U.S. sentiments in Korea.