This article shows that the statistical correlation between poverty and violence during the conflict in Nepal (1996–2006) is unlikely to be explained by grievances or low opportunity costs among the poor, but is better explained by considering the rebels’ strategy. This underscores the importance of validating arguments from statistical studies.

Violence in the Kashmir Valley has dramatically declined since 2003, but this has not created a stable political order. India has not succeeded in overcoming the contradiction between its articulated ideals of “normalcy” and its actual policy, which undermines those ideals. This debilitating tension can be found elsewhere in Asia.

This article focuses on India's relationship with Sri Lanka in examining why a regional power failed to manage a conflict in its immediate neighborhood. Historical and domestic factors help explain India's largely hands-off policy (1991–2006). In contrast, regional and international factors underpin its support of Colombo's military campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, including New Delhi's concerns about China.

Political developments in Sri Lanka in 2009 centered primarily around the end of the protracted civil war between the state and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), with the total military defeat of the LTTE. Sri Lanka subsequently entered an uncertain phase of post-civil war political reconstruction. The announcement to hold early presidential elections in January 2010 added to uncertainties to Sri Lanka's post-civil war political process. Sri Lanka also moved away from the West toward other Asian and Middle Eastern powers.

Inter-communal and insurgent violence has been entrenched in Northeast India for decades. At present, however, attacks against central government forces are in abeyance. This downturn reflects the consolidation of local regimes of corruption and repression. New Delhi tolerates and even supports such localized autocracy as a means to manage security threats.