Within international relations theory, there is significant disagreement on the nature and significance of leaders’ dispute outcome preferences. While many variants of realism assume that such preferences are relatively fixed and homogeneous, both the liberal and the constructivist schools view them as significant variables. This debate remains unresolved because, for the standard large-sample conflict data sets, there are no direct measures of leadership preferences over outcomes in given types of international disputes. Using a conflict bargaining experiment, we ask whether, after controlling for the effects of relative power and initial conditions, leadership preferences have a statistically significant impact. We use two different country samples—from China and the United States—to examine whether the impact of leadership preferences varies internationally. We find that realist-style preferences are a special rather than a general case, and that such differences have significant implications for understanding continuities and changes in Chinese and US foreign policies.

Early Trump administration initiatives upset regional stability, complicating the foreign policies of Asian partners and opponents alike. Subsequent pragmatic summitry eased regional anxiety and clarified the new government’s security and political objectives. The administration’s national security strategy, released in December, provided a well-integrated security, economic, and diplomatic strategy for Asia and the rest of the world.

In 2016, US strategic engagement in Asia faced a widening array of challenges emanating both from the region and, troublingly, from within America itself. As the new Donald Trump administration prepared to take office in January 2017, major uncertainties loomed over US Asia policy.

This article explores which factors influenced the process of US–Japan negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership. It argues that while pressures from major societal groups and legislative members hampered progress of bilateral negotiations, state leaders’ preferences for reacting strategically to geopolitical and geo-economic developments played a catalytic role in propelling the negotiations.

Washington advanced its “rebalance” effort in Asia, with final agreement among the partners of the Trans-Pacific Partnership a major highlight in 2015. However, US diplomatic and military assets remained primarily focused in the Middle East, while the South China Sea and cybersecurity topped a worrisome list of US–China tensions.

Given several possible strategic scenarios for East Asia, I argue that the region is likely to be divided by China’s growing power and the American presence along with its allies. The bipolar system in Asia will be relatively stable, however, because of conventional military balance, nuclear deterrence, and economic interdependence.

Since 2001, China has warily watched the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and associated footprint in Central Asia. In 2014, Beijing grew alarmed that a U.S. exit would prompt a resurgence of violence and Islamic radicalism in Afghanistan that could spill over into neighboring states, including China.

The year 2014 in the Philippines witnessed President Aquino’s administration moving forward with initiatives on multiple fronts, including foreign relations and the peace process in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, even as leading opposition politicians experienced increasing difficulties in the face of anti-corruption charges.

This paper analyzes China’s impact on Australia-U.S. relations from 1949 to 1996, including how far Australia’s China policy followed the American lead. The conclusion: American influence was dominant, but Australia’s own initiative was enough to belie the suggestion that it was no more than a blind follower.

Asia’s middle powers face a trilateral dilemma stemming from their relationships with the U.S. and China. This paper uses the Australian example to examine the dilemma. It shows that Australia has bound itself to the U.S. because of domestic political factors, cost considerations, a belief that it can keep its interests separate, and its perception of regional threats. The paper then argues that others are likely to resolve their trilateral dilemmas in ways that make the regional strategic dynamic more competitive.

In responding to China’s rise, the best strategy for Australia involves a combination of accommodation and “soft balancing.” The viability of this strategy is related to the extent to which U.S.-China relations are cooperative or conflictual. Recent Australian governments have been successful in implementing this preferred strategy.

Uncertainties about the 2014 security, political, and economic transitions pervaded Afghanistan in 2013. The failure in 2013 to sign a U.S.-Afghan security agreement permitting the presence of U.S. troops after 2014 deepens those anxieties. As ISAF forces continued to withdraw from Afghanistan, Afghan security forces now have primary responsibility for Afghanistan’s security but still face critical challenges and an undefeated Taliban. Peace negotiations have been stalled. Politics were dominated by the upcoming 2014 presidential election that can renew the legitimacy of the existing political system or throw the country into turmoil.

This article focuses on how the U.S. military assesses the threat of a Taiwan Strait crisis over the next two decades, America’s possible responses, and the U.S. capacity for effective intervention. It examines the drivers behind the U.S. approach, highlighting their implications.

Against China's attempts at cultivating multilateral forums to augment and institutionalize its influence in Central, Northeast, and Southeast Asia, Japan's major foreign policy challenge now is how to secure its own interests in these forums while balancing its relations with China and the United States.

Despite agreements in 2007 in the Six-Party Talks, the U.S. and South Korea have had trouble reaching consensus in dealing with subsequent nuclear crises spawned by North Korea. This study focuses on South Korean strategic thinking about and policy toward North Korea and Korean unification, and their changes since the 1990s.

By conducting a set of quantitative surveys, this study evaluates the perception of Chinese students on terrorism. Three questions are tackled: (1) how they know about terrorism; (2) how they evaluate terrorist organizations and the U.S., and (3) how they view the corresponding Chinese foreign policy.

South Korea's mode of responding to the rise of China is not fixed but continues to evolve. The recent clash over Koguryo historiography provides a sobering example of how easily the symbiotic relationship can be abruptly interrupted. It shows the need for careful management of the bilateral relationship by both Seoul and Beijing.

American foreign policy in Southeast Asia from 1975 to the present can be characterized as exhibiting varying degrees of benign neglect, with episodic attention to perceived security threats. Current policies are narrowly focused on anti-terrorism; their perceived anti-Muslim overtones, while engendering instrumental cooperation, have tended to alienate Southeast Asian publics. U.S. influence in Southeast Asia appears to be waning, with China capitalizing on opportunities to expand its influence.

Since the collapse of the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework in 2002, the Bush administration has failed to restrain North Korea's nuclear weapons ambitions, principally because of the constraints of highly idealized convictions. Resolution of the Korean nuclear crisis now depends on U.S. initiative beyond the boundaries of these predispositions and beyond the terms of the nuclear crisis itself.

Japan's Host Nation Support program represents one characteristic of the U.S.-Japan security relationship in that Japan contributes mainly financially. This article examines how recent events in the relationship might affect Japan's policy decision on the program. It also discusses the prospects for the next Special Measures Agreement and beyond.