Afghanistan in 2019 was marked by advances and setbacks with respect to stabilizing the country and reshaping its relations with international partners. The year brought new presidential elections and signs of potential political dialogue, as well as hopes for expanded economic ties with neighbors. But there are still uncertainties about the prospects of US withdrawal and the country’s future.

The year 2017 witnessed continued challenges to the credibility and competence of the so-called National Unity Government in Kabul. President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah competed over the perquisites of power rather than collaborating to secure a viable future for their country. US and NATO forces remained at a stalemate with the Taliban, while Afghanistan’s predatory neighbors were as self-interested as ever. Hard-won gains remain reversible.

As the United States’ war in Afghanistan enters its 16th year, the Taliban insurgency shows no signs of waning; therefore it is worth deliberating aspects of the movement that have been ignored or forgotten by the West. Pashtuns, many of whom are loyal Taliban members, are an integral part of the instability that has wracked Afghanistan for generations. This paper seeks to understand the Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan, exploring their role in any resolution to the war.

Hopes for national unity and stability in Afghanistan were dashed in 2015 as the government lost control of significant territory to insurgents. Kunduz City fell briefly to the Taliban, the first major city to fall to them since 2001. The ANSF experienced heavy casualties, at a time when nearly one-fifth of the country’s districts were either controlled or heavily contested by the Taliban.

Pakistan’s government adopted an ambitious National Action Plan to counter terrorism. Aside from poor implementation, the plan remains bedeviled by the powerful military’s selective counterterrorism approach, which targets hostile militant groups, like the Pakistani Taliban, but employs others, including the Afghan Taliban, to assert its own influence over Kabul and limit what it sees as Indian interference in Afghanistan.

U.N.-sanctioned interventions were imposed in Afghanistan to punish Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists, establish effective government to prevent a Taliban resurgence, and enable U.S.-NATO troops to withdraw (except for a residual force to train Afghan security forces and conduct counterterrorist operations). The mission has failed: a “thugocracy” has been established. Will it be replaced by a Taliban theocracy?

The attacks of 9/11 spurred the U.S. to pursue national security interests in Afghanistan through expensive, overlapping strategies. The Afghan War helped elicit changes in the region that produced new American interests there. Because of a modern “Great Game” between regional and global actors in and around Afghanistan, the U.S. cannot afford to withdraw from the region.

A year after assuming power, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s government faced a political crisis fomented by the pro-military opposition leader Imran Khan, who mobilized his supporters to protest alleged electoral rigging in the 2013 poll. Khan had to call off the protests after the Pakistani Taliban’s grisly terrorist attack on an army-run school in retaliation for the army’s offensive against them in North Waziristan.

Pakistan made history, with an elected civilian government completing a full five-year term in 2013 before turning power over to another elected civilian government. Elections saw high turnout, bringing Nawaz Sharif back as prime minister. Though former military ruler Pervez Musharraf was placed on trial, the Pakistani military remains politically powerful. Violent militancy, power shortages, and fiscal problems continued, but an IMF loan should provide some short-term relief.

As the 2014 transition of the U.S. out of Afghanistan approaches, progress has been made in weakening the Taliban insurgency and strengthening Afghan forces’ capacity. But the Taliban still remains entrenched, negotiations have not taken off, the Afghan government suffers from a profound legitimacy crisis, and Afghanistan’s economic future seems fraught with instability.

Pakistan came into sharp conflict with the U.S. and the international community in 2011 over its long-standing support of Islamist militants. The killing of Osama bin Laden left many speculating whether Pakistan's intelligence agencies were either complicit in harboring him or incompetent. Pakistan's various conflicts, as well as Pakistan Taliban violence, continue to claim thousands of lives. Economic growth remains inadequate to provide jobs for its ever-growing population, and both the civilian and military leaderships appear unwilling to make structural economic changes to attract vital international developmental aid.

Afghanistan confronted further turbulence in 2011, involving the assassinations of prominent figures, tense regional relations, and uncertainty about where the draw down of foreign forces in Afghanistan might lead. Popular confidence in Afghanistan's future direction remains weak, and President Hamid Karzai has had little success in boosting his government's standing.

Afghanistan in 2010 witnessed a number of important events including cabinet changes, legislative elections, and several major international conferences focused on its problems. It continued to be confronted by long-term problems of insecurity, compounded by uncertainty about both the trajectory of U.S. policy and the legitimacy of its own rulers.

Afghanistan is often depicted as a failing state, but its failures display distinctive patterns over time and space. Regional variations in governance have been important in shaping the ways the Afghan state has failed and the consequences of these failures. This article argues that a history of better governance in the north facilitated the disarmament of militia warlords and comparative stability. By contrast, the south has a long history of minimal formal governance, creating opportunities for increased Taliban insurgency.

Party-based political competition played an important part in shaping key events in Pakistan in 2009. This article examines the impact of party-based competition on the much-delayed restoration of Supreme Court Chief Justice Mohammad Iftikhar Chaudhry, efforts to address (with U.S. assistance) Pakistan's growing Taliban-affiliated insurgency, and both federal and provincial economic policies. This article concludes that party-based competition will continue to shape Pakistan's evolving security and economic situation in 2010.

The state-building endeavor in Afghanistan became more tenuous in 2009. Charges of increased corruption against Afghan government officials were highlighted in a presidential election marred by fraud. Taliban and other insurgent activities escalated to spread to most parts of the country. Relations between the Afghan government and the major international donor countries also deteriorated. However, member countries of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan decided to increase international troop strength and tried to elicit greater commitment from the Afghan government to address problems of governance.

The state-building endeavor in Afghanistan came to the brink in 2008 with the Taliban insurgency taking control of some southern districts, high poppy production fueling the illicit economy, widespread charges of corruption, and a looming humanitarian disaster. Afghans increasingly became disillusioned by high civilian casualties and the government's failure to provide improved socioeconomic conditions. By year's end, there was also increased pressure for negotiations with moderate Taliban elements.

In 2007, Pakistan experienced one of the most violent and eventful years in its history. The year included the dismissal and reinstatement of the Supreme Court chief justice, the Red Mosque siege and consequent killings, farcical presidential elections, intensified violence in tribal areas that spread to other regions of the country, the imposition of emergency rule and suspension of the Constitution, and the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.

In 2006 Pakistan saw increased ethnic violence in Balochistan, the reassembling and resurgence of Taliban forces across its western and northern borders, the watering down of the draconian Hudood Ordinances, and small symbolic steps toward democratization by the two major opposition leaders.