This was a year of transition in North Korea, as leader Kim Jong Un held firm to his strategic shift of putting “all efforts” into economic development in the face of ongoing international sanctions. Kim’s summit diplomacy with the US and South Korea stalled, while ties improved markedly with China and modestly with Russia. The US and South Korea resumed downsized joint military exercises and North Korea resumed short-range missile testing.

The Trump administration’s policy on Asia in 2019 displayed a mix of overreach and fecklessness. In terms of economic, strategic, and cooperative relations, the US floundered, stumbled, and fell short, particularly in its efforts to deal with China and North Korea. Overall, observers saw more grandstanding than anything else.

President Xi Jinping dominated the Chinese stage during 2018, continuing to consolidate his power as the CCP sought to reassert its primacy. China flexed its muscles as a great power in a pitch for global leadership. Xi pushed constantly to portray China as the promoter of an open global economy, even as his own continued to slow incrementally amid the widening trade war with the US.

A summit with North Korea’s leader in June saw President Trump greatly ease regional tensions created by his earlier maximum pressure policy against North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. He also launched punitive tariffs to change trading relations to US benefit, with adverse impact on regional economies. China became the focus, resulting in a trade war accompanied by a hardening of US policy, foreshadowing intense competition.

Kim Jong-un showcased a series of summit meetings throughout 2018, including the first-ever meeting of a North Korean leader with a sitting US president. North Korea improved its strained relations with China and South Korea. The country’s denuclearization has yet to be seen, but these events sparked considerable debate about the future.

This paper examines the determinants of North Korea’s foreign policymaking to show why denuclearization efforts continue to fail to curb, let alone end, its nuclear weapons program. Two determinants, namely South Korea’s existential threat and North Korea’s juche ideology, are explored to conclude that “nuclear North Korea” is a natural and non-negotiable manifestation of its foreign policymaking.

Early Trump administration initiatives upset regional stability, complicating the foreign policies of Asian partners and opponents alike. Subsequent pragmatic summitry eased regional anxiety and clarified the new government’s security and political objectives. The administration’s national security strategy, released in December, provided a well-integrated security, economic, and diplomatic strategy for Asia and the rest of the world.

The coping strategies that small Chinese firms operating in North Korea have chosen involve insinuating themselves into North Korean political and social networks, and structuring their investments so as to minimize their exposure to North Korean infrastructure, workers, and institutions. As a result, it is unlikely that Chinese firms will be the main drivers of market transformation in North Korea.

Kim Jong Un further consolidated his leadership position at the Seventh Congress of the Workers’ Party in May, the first congress since 1980. Pyongyang conducted two nuclear tests and made advances in missile delivery, eliciting strong sanctions resolutions from the UN Security Council, first in March and again in November.

North Korea upgraded its nuclear and military power and grew its economy slightly, thereby realizing Kim Jong Un’s byungjin line. It also attempted to open new external fronts and to coerce the South to cooperate on its terms, but failed. Instead, it retreated into a repaired relationship with China.

The Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea since 1972 have attempted reconciliation, but without durable success. The latter’s building of a nuclear arsenal erased the progress achieved in 1989–1992 and 1998–2008. Assessed here is whether the new leaders of both Koreas since 2012 might be able to resume progress toward reconciliation. Ultimately, Park alone cannot sustain progress toward reconciliation unless she receives substantial domestic political support and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un responds constructively to her effort.

In 2014, North Korea neither overcame its isolation due to its nuclear weapons and hostile geostrategic posture nor reformed its economy. Kim Jong Un learned on the job, consolidated his leadership, avoided military risk, and opened new channels to South Korea, Japan, and Russia to reduce dependence on China.

Nowhere is China’s aid program both more important and yet less understood than with North Korea. This article examines two puzzles: China’s aid to North Korea coexists with a discriminatory trading relationship, and China continues to provide aid even as it tightens economic sanctions on North Korea’s nuclear program.

North Korea’s deepening economic interactions with China have encouraged the former’s localized trends toward a more market-oriented and externally engaged society. This article compares China’s engagement strategy to South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy” and then assesses China’s transformational influence on North Korean institutions, cross-border cooperation, businesspeople, and consumers.

During the succession from Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un, North Korea witnessed a revival of party institutions. However, the most distinctive feature of the transition was a succession of purges that replaced powerful figures from the Kim Jong Il era with new loyalists. The system remains personalist, but with strong reliance on the military and security apparatus.

This article examines North Korea’s current energy security situation and suggests several possible energy options for the country to overcome its energy shortage crisis. The study investigates the serious problems of North Korea’s heavily China-dependent energy structure, and ultimately proposes ensuring North Korea’s energy security by promoting various natural gas aid programs over the longer term.

This paper analyzes the potential risks of the Russia-North Korea-South Korea (RNS) gas pipeline, comparing it with the Russia-Ukraine-Europe (RUE) pipeline. I argue that the possibility of disputes is much higher in the RNS case. Furthermore, I propose that the South Korean government opt to import liquefied natural gas by ship directly from Russia if contingency plans in the case of gas supply disruptions in the RNS pipeline are not available.

This article investigates the causes of North Korea’s failure to pursue export-oriented industrialization, and examines whether Sino-North Korean economic cooperation might facilitate such a transformation or not. It concludes that Sino-North Korean economic interactions are more likely to reinforce North Korea’s traditional resource dependency than to stimulate export-oriented industrialization.

Thus far, North Korea appears to have made a successful transition of power to the third generation of Kims, installing the 28-year-old Kim Jong Un as the country's supreme leader. However, due to the diminishing legitimacy of multiple generations of inherited leadership, Kim Jong Un must deliver what North Korea needs most, namely, economic development. Kim has promised to give it priority, but structural (political, economic, and social) constraints do not allow him much room to maneuver.

Focusing on the early stage, this paper compares the Kim Il Sung-Kim Jong Il succession with the Kim Jong Il-Kim Jong Un succession. Analyzing their differences and similarities, the study attempts to provide a better understanding of the leadership formation of Kim Jong Un, who now rules North Korea.