Since the September 2016 attack in Uri, Indo-Pak relations have steadily gotten worse. India cites Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in Kashmir as the major reason for this deterioration, with the 14 February 2019 bombing at Pulwama as the most recent dramatic example; Pakistan blames Indian atrocities in Kashmir. But after every attempt to initiate dialogue, there is a return to hostility. This paper analyzes this cyclical pattern of dialogue, estrangement, and hostility in Indo-Pak relations. Further, it seeks to explain the structural, ideational, and strategic aspects of the problem and to outline a course correction in Indian foreign policy.

Violence in the Kashmir Valley has dramatically declined since 2003, but this has not created a stable political order. India has not succeeded in overcoming the contradiction between its articulated ideals of “normalcy” and its actual policy, which undermines those ideals. This debilitating tension can be found elsewhere in Asia.

The Congress Party, although in a strong position to improve matters in 2010, generally proved disappointing, especially in the realm of governance and public policy. However, Indian authorities did demonstrate the ability to manage the economy well in a challenging international economic climate. President Obama's three-day trip helped to reinvigorate bilateral ties, but India's relations with China and Pakistan remained testy.

The May 2008 Jammu & Kashmir government's decision to transfer 99 acres of land to a Hindu shrine reignited the Kashmiri nationalist movement. This essay argues that Kashmiri ethnonationalist aspirations remain entrenched among the Valley's Muslim population and that electoral participation is no guarantee of attenuated ethnonationalist demands.