The coronavirus dominated Indonesian politics in 2020. Rather than propelling Indonesia in new directions, however, the pandemic amplified existing political and societal dynamics.

We present findings from eight nationally representative surveys conducted during the 2019 Indonesian presidential campaign, in which we measured voters’ reported belief in prominent pieces of misinformation. Younger, better-educated, and wealthier voters were more likely to believe the misinformation. These results are true for stories about both the incumbent (Joko Widodo) and the challenger (Prabowo Subianto). These findings represent a significant departure from results in Western Europe and North America, where a surge in misinformation has disproportionately targeted older and less educated voters.

In the late twentieth century, the Chinese communities in Indonesia and Malaysia were politically repressed. But recent events have prompted optimism that the Chinese communities in both countries could move forward and claim their rightful place as equal citizens. But while the Indonesian Chinese community appears to have made some headway, the situation in Malaysia has not improved, and in some ways, it is worse. We argue that institutional frameworks and political Islam are the main threats to political rights for the Chinese communities in both countries and that there are lessons to be learned from these neighboring nations.

Using original survey data, we test the level, distribution, and demographic patterns of populist attitudes in Indonesia. Populist attitudes are widely spread across the political spectrum; disproportionately high in the middle and upper classes; and particularly robust when coupled with other primary ideologies, such as Islamism and secularism.

The fall of Suharto in 1998 opened up a new space for the public articulation of Chinese identity in Indonesia. Since the decrees that lifted the ban on Chinese language, Mandarin classes have had an unprecedented boom. This paper reflects on this phenomenon in the geopolitical context of the economic rise of China and its promotion of soft power, as well as the market forces that reward Mandarin competency in contemporary Indonesia.

This article argues that new personality-centric movements have redefined the nexus between activism and electoral politics in Indonesia. It illustrates how these movements have challenged the role of political parties and consultants in electoral campaigning, and how their growing prominence may affect the future trajectory of Indonesian politics.

This article discusses the questions of representativeness and legitimacy within the context of the Majelis Rakyat Papua (Papuan People’s Assembly) as an integral part of the Indonesian government’s asymmetrical-decentralization scheme to reduce separatist tendencies in Papua. We find that the MRP has generally failed in its representation and its claim to legitimacy.

In mass demonstrations spearheaded by a coalition of Islamic radicals, 2017 witnessed a polarizing assault on the nation’s broadly secular founding creed, Pancasila. With the arrest and imprisonment of the popular ethnic-Chinese Christian mayor of Jakarta on spurious blasphemy charges, even the Indonesian president was left on the back foot and obliged to push back.

This study deals with the influence of poverty as a socioeconomic cause of political Islam. Using Indonesian survey data, it explores how Muslims come to support Islamic political parties, and whether the variable of poverty or low income predicts politicization of Islam with other variables under control.

During his second year in power, Indonesian President Joko Widodo faced contradictory yet interrelated trends: while he consolidated his grip over parliament and improved his approval ratings, the president’s remaining opponents shifted the focus of political contestation from the state’s institutions onto the streets. Additionally burdened by economic uncertainty and rising regional tensions over the South China Sea, Indonesian democracy thus continues to be vulnerable, its outward stability notwithstanding.

This article argues that the primary obstacle to the independence of Indonesia’s new reform-oriented governance institutions is the extent to which foreign interests have a stake in their formal decisions. They appear to regulate or adjudicate according to rules, in Indonesian-on-Indonesian disputes. When a foreigner-versus-Indonesian pairing is at hand, domestic vested interests tend to prevail.

The new Indonesian president, Joko Widodo ( “ Jokowi ” ), has faced formidable challenges on a number of fronts in his first year in office. Although Jokowi has managed to roll out his pet projects for the poor, management of competing partisan and personal interests as well as the economy and religious conflict continues to be a challenge. Overall, the new government ’ s contribution to democratic reforms has been modest thus far.

In 2014, Indonesia inaugurated as president the former Governor of Jakarta, Joko Widodo, or “Jokowi,” raising public expectations for reform especially among people outside the powerful political and business elite circles. It is uncertain to what extent, and how, the new government will achieve his reform agendas. Moreover, a relatively weak economy and declining civil liberties may pose an additional challenge, despite Jokowi’s avowed commitment to structural reforms and good governance.

This research explains the politics of financial reforms in Indonesia by applying the theory of veto players. By comparing the periods during and after the International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs, I analyze temporal variations in the effects of the IMF and the number of veto players on financial reforms in Indonesia.

Ahead of upcoming elections, expectations ran high in 2013 across the archipelago for a highly pluralistic electorate. With China as a leading trading partner, the backdrop for Indonesia was steady economic growth, albeit checked by a sliding currency, a current account deficit, and a depressing culture of corruption. Mixing commerce and geopolitics, China, the U.S., and Japan all turned to Indonesia to expand their influence.

To what extent are jihadists in Indonesia disengaging from violence? Based on original fieldwork in Jakarta and Central Sulawesi, including interviews with 23 current and former Poso-based jihadists, we examine the emotional, psychological, rational, and relational factors that can lead militants to turn away from terror tactics.

Two sides of the debate on Indonesia's future turn on the tension between sustained economic growth fueled by demand for Indonesia's natural resources and the highly skewed distribution of wealth. With the Indonesia boosters forecasting a vertiginous rise of Southeast Asia's largest economy, the naysayers point to the deadweights of corruption, lack of transparency, and poor governance. With democratic electoralism revived in a post-authoritarian setting, such issues can no longer be swept under the carpet: they are matched by a relatively open media and burgeoning civil society.

Corruption and political infighting continued to dominate the headlines in Indonesia in 2011. While lawmakers and political parties continued to be deeply unpopular, new developments dragged President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's popularity down to all-time lows. Religious violence ticked upward and took new forms. Meanwhile, the economy posted strong gains, and the government continued to look for ways to raise its profile on the international stage.

This article explains distinctive patterns of Islamist mobilization in Indonesia by focusing on the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). It argues that the relatively solid party-mass relations and broad spatial penetration of PKS are conditioned by its organizational ability to deliver welfare services to strategically targeted constituencies to help construct a community base.

Has the global financial and economic crisis provided stimulus for institutional development in ASEAN? Exploring the empirical trends concerning ASEAN's plans for a comprehensive community by 2015, it is argued that no such developments have emerged. Instead, two alternative sources for potential change in ASEAN's institutional norms are elaborated.