The Chinese Communist Party has been surprisingly successful in carrying out its plans in the face of various challenges in the post-Mao era. Compared to their central counterparts, the operating patterns of local institutions in tackling such difficulties have been less examined. This paper aims to fill this gap by exploring the party’s management of provincial standing committees (PSCs). As the highest level of local collective leadership, the PSC essentially sets the agenda for the province. Using a new database of PSC members from 1980 to 2016, this study provides a systematic illustration of the historical composition of provincial collective leadership. Instead of making drastic changes, the party has subtly shifted the roles of provincial leaders: it has redefined the role of the vice party secretary, adjusted the number of posts in the provincial government, and raised the level of professionalism.

In a year of considerable pomp and circumstance at home, China’s leaders continued to focus on how to deal with slowing economic growth, and the need for greater unity and support for the party (and Xi’s) priorities and goals. Despite efforts to persuade others of the global benefits of China’s rise, a number of key international actors seemed to increasingly think otherwise.

Strongman rule returned to China in 2017 when Xi Jinping secured near-total political dominance. Repression remained intense while the Chinese economy performed reasonably well due to credit support. US–China relations are entering an uncertain phase. Strongman rule is likely to increase the risk of major policy mistakes and deliver few concrete achievements.

China's new religious policy expands the institutional autonomy of religious organizations, limits the power of religious affairs bureaus, and provides for administrative appeal, judicial challenge, and sanctioning errant officials. As such, it is an effort of the Chinese government to integrate religious policy with its systemic socioeconomic and political reforms.

Increasing economic liberalization of the Chinese media has not resulted in proportional political liberalization, and previous explanations for the state's puzzlingly firm grip are inadequate. This article argues that a ““regime of uncertainty”” is critical toward keeping the Chinese media in line.