Three aspects symbolize the state of affairs in and around Afghanistan in 2018: the fragmentation of domestic political actors, the increasing desecuritization of rhetoric with respect to Afghanistan by neighboring countries, and the diversification of Afghanistan’s global partners. While the US strategy showed signs of stalling amid increasing violence and the fragmentation of local actors, there are changes in the attitude of neighboring states.

This article assesses the legacy of the National Solidarity Programme in seven districts of Wardak Province, Afghanistan. We find that the NSP largely achieved its development objectives, but had limited effects on state–society relations. The findings also raise questions about the sustainability of community-driven development in insecure contexts.

This paper explores the dynamics of competition inherent in the “aid marketplace” in Afghanistan and proposes a holistic theoretical framework for understanding the actions of aid actors based on a taxonomy of mercenary (rational), missionary (altruistic), and misfit (bureaucratic) pressures, which both aggravate and lessen competition between actors.

In Afghanistan, relationship-based networks permeate formal governance institutions, the economy, and everyday life, regulating how resources are distributed. This paper argues that since 2001, modes of external intervention in Afghanistan have failed to understand these “rules of the game.” This paper sets out a new understanding of the power relations that govern engagement in politics and the economy.

This article examines post-2001 state-building in Afghanistan. In so doing, it explores how interactions among aid, politics, and state capacity shaped the characteristics of the state by looking at the existing conditions, sources of state income, the development planning process, aid coordination and alignment, and interventions in building state capacity.

Since the 1990s India has been committed to the completion of the Chabahar Port despite external and internal constraints that slowed the project’s development. This article explores the reasons behind Indian interest in the development of the Chabahar Port, and the challenges this project continues to face.

Since 9/11, the relationship between China and Afghanistan has experienced four stages, which reflect China’s changing roles in this area. China is likely to play a greater role as it seeks to press ahead, despite obstacles, with its new Silk Road projects. In the future, China will likely be involved in Afghanistan in greater depth and on a larger scale.

The year 2017 witnessed continued challenges to the credibility and competence of the so-called National Unity Government in Kabul. President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah competed over the perquisites of power rather than collaborating to secure a viable future for their country. US and NATO forces remained at a stalemate with the Taliban, while Afghanistan’s predatory neighbors were as self-interested as ever. Hard-won gains remain reversible.

As the United States’ war in Afghanistan enters its 16th year, the Taliban insurgency shows no signs of waning; therefore it is worth deliberating aspects of the movement that have been ignored or forgotten by the West. Pashtuns, many of whom are loyal Taliban members, are an integral part of the instability that has wracked Afghanistan for generations. This paper seeks to understand the Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan, exploring their role in any resolution to the war.

Hopes for national unity and stability in Afghanistan were dashed in 2015 as the government lost control of significant territory to insurgents. Kunduz City fell briefly to the Taliban, the first major city to fall to them since 2001. The ANSF experienced heavy casualties, at a time when nearly one-fifth of the country’s districts were either controlled or heavily contested by the Taliban.

U.N.-sanctioned interventions were imposed in Afghanistan to punish Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists, establish effective government to prevent a Taliban resurgence, and enable U.S.-NATO troops to withdraw (except for a residual force to train Afghan security forces and conduct counterterrorist operations). The mission has failed: a “thugocracy” has been established. Will it be replaced by a Taliban theocracy?

The attacks of 9/11 spurred the U.S. to pursue national security interests in Afghanistan through expensive, overlapping strategies. The Afghan War helped elicit changes in the region that produced new American interests there. Because of a modern “Great Game” between regional and global actors in and around Afghanistan, the U.S. cannot afford to withdraw from the region.

Since 2001, China has warily watched the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and associated footprint in Central Asia. In 2014, Beijing grew alarmed that a U.S. exit would prompt a resurgence of violence and Islamic radicalism in Afghanistan that could spill over into neighboring states, including China.

Critics claim that lack of professionalism among Afghan provincial leaders undermines the government’s legitimacy, creating opportunities for the insurgency. Data on provincial governors show that those most effective at deterring insurgent attacks tend to have qualities associated with “warlords” rather than professionalism. Decentralization could harness these characteristics to improve governance.

The Russian government under Vladimir Putin has long-term geostrategic interests in Afghanistan: stability, economic development, and curbing narcotics flowing into Central Asia and thence to Russia. Moscow is in the difficult position of not wanting American forces to stay in Afghanistan but also not wanting the drawdown of forces to leave behind chaos.

This article assesses Britain's contemporary relationship with Afghanistan, its goals and interests there, and its possible post-2014 role. It is argued that Britain might continue to play a limited but non-negligible military, intelligence, fiscal, and diplomatic role, even as British policymakers are increasingly bound by fiscal and domestic political constraints.

Labeled the Year of “Transition,” 2014 was a watershed in modern Afghan history. It marked the first peaceful transition of power in more than a century, when Hamid Karzai handed over authority to Ashraf Ghani on September 29. The transition was not seamless, and the country teetered on the brink of a coup following the June presidential runoff.

Uncertainties about the 2014 security, political, and economic transitions pervaded Afghanistan in 2013. The failure in 2013 to sign a U.S.-Afghan security agreement permitting the presence of U.S. troops after 2014 deepens those anxieties. As ISAF forces continued to withdraw from Afghanistan, Afghan security forces now have primary responsibility for Afghanistan’s security but still face critical challenges and an undefeated Taliban. Peace negotiations have been stalled. Politics were dominated by the upcoming 2014 presidential election that can renew the legitimacy of the existing political system or throw the country into turmoil.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) appears today as a mature, comprehensive, and inclusive intergovernmental regional organization. However, co-piloted by China and Russia, the SCO’s course still raises many questions about its objectives, priorities, and, more important, its achievements and raison d’être, as well as the enduring rivalries among its members.

As the 2014 transition of the U.S. out of Afghanistan approaches, progress has been made in weakening the Taliban insurgency and strengthening Afghan forces’ capacity. But the Taliban still remains entrenched, negotiations have not taken off, the Afghan government suffers from a profound legitimacy crisis, and Afghanistan’s economic future seems fraught with instability.