With its emphasis on organizational minimalism, how does ASEAN induce change in its members’ policies? This paper examines the impact of consensus within ASEAN on haze mitigation in the Indonesian archipelago. When ASEAN articulates its environmental initiatives with a strong consensus, this clarity in its norms incentivizes emulation. The stronger the consensus within the group, the more compelling it becomes for members to adopt the agreement. Such prosocial behavior reflects nudging. Strong ASEAN consensus is a precursor of nudging that leads to dimmer hotspots. This study draws on discourse analysis of ASEAN summit statements on the haze, R programming to analyze NASA data on the brightness of peatland hotspots, and a case study to illustrate the causal mechanism. The findings identify ASEAN’s role in environmental governance, particularly with respect to when consensus-based nudging is more or less likely to incentivize member states to curb transboundary haze.

China’s growing development assistance has become commonly perceived as a threat to the autonomy and development of Southeast Asian countries that had promoted by Japan in the past. This paper challenges that understanding by comparing China’s development assistance with Japan’s engagement in the region. The comparison supports an alternative perspective, which sees Chinese development assistance as favorable for Japan’s interests.

The Trump administration’s policy on Asia in 2019 displayed a mix of overreach and fecklessness. In terms of economic, strategic, and cooperative relations, the US floundered, stumbled, and fell short, particularly in its efforts to deal with China and North Korea. Overall, observers saw more grandstanding than anything else.

This study explores the relationship between special economic zones and regional integration in ASEAN countries, and identifies how to leverage the attributes of SEZs to deepen regional integration for regional development. The key argument is that SEZs can play a vital role in promoting regional integration if ASEAN member nations join hands to craft a visionary strategy.

Like other proposed mega-FTAs, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is intended to address twenty-first-century trade issues. The attributes of the RCEP negotiations are unique, however—being shaped by the dominant political interests in its member states and by the particular character of economic interdependence in the region.

Brunei and Malaysia are promoting the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration but enforce a brand of Islamic law that systematically violates it. The paradoxical ways in which policymakers are navigating between the two, and the empirical realities of Islamic governance, impede the project of a transdoctrinal justification of human rights.

Both Russia’s 2012 APEC chairmanship and recent dynamics in its dialogue partnership with ASEAN indicate Russia’s intention and ability to act as a constructive player engaged in regional institutional activities in East Asia. However, the implementation of this intention faces both domestic and international limitations.

Perspectives from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam show that South Korea’s middle power role in Southeast Asia is confined to economics and capacity building. Despite being absent from Southeast Asia’s geostrategic calculus, Korea’s non-revisionist inclination is seen to be advantageous in its pursuit of enhanced middle power status.

Even as economic benefits are emphasized in India’s connectivity efforts with its neighbors, strategic interests also drive Delhi’s connectivity interests. How promptly Delhi addresses the structural, security, and geostrategic factors that pose major challenges to India’s regional connectivity goals will determine its future role in the region.

This article assesses Southeast Asian views of the US “rebalance,” examining reactions to US military deployments, military assistance to partners, and support for Southeast Asian diplomacy on South China Sea conflicts. Although not ostensibly designed to contain China, the rebalance provides Southeast Asia with hedging options against more assertive PRC actions in the South China Sea.

Using a conflict transformation framework, this article demonstrates that positive transformations have taken place in the South China Sea between 1991 and 2007. Even though these transformations have been weakened in recent years, particularly regarding the actor aspect, it is concluded that a major armed conflict is still highly unlikely.

Institutions do not always matter. They can make it easier for states to deal with non-traditional security threats and alleviate arms races, but they are less likely to matter in dealing with territorial disputes and negotiating multilateral trade agreements. We should neither overestimate nor underestimate the utility of ASEAN-centered regionalism in the Asia Pacific.

Prospects for a U.S. decline in global power generated by political strife and protracted economic recession at home have affected Washington’s regional diplomatic presence and strategic influence in the Asia-Pacific. Ongoing regional power politics and economic imperatives may constrain the ability of the U.S. to quickly recover from the largely self-imposed damage it has inflicted on its future role as a central regional player.

Interactions between China and Japan in multilateral “ASEAN plus dialogue partners” forums––the economic groupings ASEAN Plus Three and East Asia Summit, and the security groupings ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus––have moved from attempts at cooperation, to competition for influence, and thence to attentiveness or disinterest.

Domestic politics in key Asian-Pacific countries dominated 2012, but the region felt China's increasing weight on sensitive issues. China's neighbors found themselves struggling to balance their growing need for the Chinese market and good relations with Beijing with outside support from the U.S. to resist Chinese pressure on the weaker states.

Cambodia in 2012 mourned the death of its revered former King Norodom Sihanouk. The government was criticized for land conflicts and the deterioration of political liberties. Otherwise, the country enjoyed strong economic growth and basked in the international spotlight as Association of Southeast Asian Nations chair. Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party further consolidated its power, sidelining opposition parties and coopting disgruntled workers and farmers.

The formulation “ASEAN Community” has been criticized for being too elitist and lacking serious efforts to solicit public opinion. This article examines how the people in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore view the concept of “community building” and the obstacles this initiative may encounter.

In the South China Sea dispute, some Track-2 settings, along with Track-1 efforts by ASEAN and China, have facilitated some conflict “management.” But they have not brought about conflict “resolution” of the basic sovereignty and control issues. Conflict “irresolution” has ensued instead. Short-term balancing may perhaps generate long-term socialization convergence.

Disputes over sovereignty and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea (SCS) involve both the claimants and major maritime powers. Two starkly different approaches to the SCS conflict are discussed: (1) diplomacy among the claimants either bilaterally or multilaterally; (2) if diplomacy fails, the claimants are building their militaries to assert their rights through force.

The “ASEAN family” of regional security institutions has a mixed record: it has proved very helpful in improving interstate trust, fairly helpful in managing peaceful change, somewhat helpful in enhancing regime stability, but virtually useless in resolving interstate conflict. Overall, East Asia remains dominated by conventional forms of international relations.