Representation is always a dynamic relation, a tatonnement , in which the represented adjust their preferences on the basis of beliefs induced by the representatives. All rulers—those selected in clean elections, those who hold such ceremonies without putting their power at stake, and those who do not even bother to hold them—claim to have reasons to be followed, and people are willing to follow them if they believe these are good reasons. Thus, individual preferences, “wills,”are influenced by the relation of representation. The controversial issue is whether the relation of representation can be assessed when preferences are endogenous, in particular when people are not exposed to a plurality of reasons.

China’s growing development assistance has become commonly perceived as a threat to the autonomy and development of Southeast Asian countries that had promoted by Japan in the past. This paper challenges that understanding by comparing China’s development assistance with Japan’s engagement in the region. The comparison supports an alternative perspective, which sees Chinese development assistance as favorable for Japan’s interests.

It is widely believed that Pakistan’s newly demonstrated nuclear weapons capability emboldened that country to launch what became the Kargil conflict of 1999 and correspondingly restrained India in responding to the attack. This article argues, however, that decision-making on both sides was driven by non-nuclear factors.

One of the public’s popular beliefs about politics is that politicians engage in rent-seeking behaviors, such as accumulating property, using their political power. By applying a regression discontinuity design, this study examines whether members of the National Assembly of South Korea gained assets during three elective terms (2004–2008, 2008–2012, and 2012–2016). The results contradict the public’s claim. In general, there is minimal evidence that election winners accumulate more assets than runners-up. And observing the winners’ premium for newly elected politicians in the 2012–2016 term, I find that it is related to a political support fund, which is a legitimate channel for politicians’ funding. The results suggest that an information disclosure policy can play a pivotal role in restricting politicians’ rent-seeking behaviors.

Despite burgeoning research on the internationalization of the Chinese renminbi, there has been surprisingly little systematic analysis of how the renminbi is actually used in foreign markets. This study provides a cross-country analysis of renminbi use in offshore foreign exchange markets, with special attention to the effects of the cooperative policy measures adopted by China and foreign states to promote the renminbi’s international use. We find that a country’s participation in the Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor scheme (which expands its renminbi investment opportunities) and its establishment of an offshore renminbi clearing bank (which provides better renminbi payment services), but not its entry into a renminbi–local currency swap agreement, facilitate use of the renminbi in its foreign exchange markets. States have played a significant role in the rise of the renminbi as a newly internationalizing currency.

We propose the logic of communitive action to analyze digitally networked social movements. Through an examination of Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement and Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement, we offer an explanatory framework of community consciousness that elucidates a new type of leadership, and discuss crowdsourcing as a supplement to the theory of social movements in the digital age.

In this article, we join an ongoing debate among Western scholars on political representation and argue that political representation is undergoing a transformation stimulated by the rapid proliferation of the new information and communication technologies. We propose that in China, the new social media have stimulated a shift from representation by official organizations to bottom-up self-representation, and from mandate political representation to embodiment. To grasp this change, we select private entrepreneurs as our focus of study and propose the concept of “connective representation.” Drawing on fieldwork in China from 2015 through 2019 and on analysis of online materials, we demonstrate how private entrepreneurs in China form and advance their collective interests through online connectivity. The concept of connective representation adds to the conventional perspectives on political representation, particularly in the authoritarian setting.

Studies of political representation have focused on responsiveness driven by electoral mechanisms in liberal-democratic regimes. In a single-party system like China’s, how does the government respond to citizens’ service requests? Whose and what interests are being represented in governmental responsiveness, and to what extent? This article explores these questions through the lens of “representation as responsiveness” by analyzing an exclusive data set from the city public service hotline in Shanghai. Data analyses show that Chinese municipalities have good responsiveness to citizens’ practical concerns, and the quality of responsive representation has been improving in recent years. However, some groups of residents tend to be underserved for multiple reasons. This article argues that a responsive model of authoritarian representation will become a significant source of resilience for the party regime.

Among the major events that occurred in Asia in 2019 were four that received global attention: the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the US-China trade war, the North Korean nuclear issue, and protests in Hong Kong. These events have significant policy implications for the world as well as for Asia.

After the stunning victory of Pakatan Harapan (Alliance of Hope) over the incumbent Barisan Nasional (National Front) in May 2018’s 14th Malaysian General Election, 2019 was a year of political transition, with Pakatan governing, Barisan rising from its political grave, and the Malaysian people getting accustomed to a two-party coalition system. In a chaotic year of party-political and electoral fatigue, social discontent, and economic slowdown, Malaysia endured its domestic troubles to remain a stable country.

A tumultuous year brought Indonesia from a polarizing general election to disparate waves of mass protests that tested the state’s tether and revealed frailties in democratic consolidation. Granted a second term, President Joko Widodo ratcheted up plans for infrastructure and human resource development, wooing foreign capital despite a challenging global environment.

In 2019, Thailand held its first election in eight years, crowned a new king for the first time in nearly 70 years, and hosted the ASEAN summits for the first time in a decade. It was an eventful year for Thailand, filled with controversy and attempts to restore stability and the democratic legitimacy lost after the coup of 2014. Progress was marred by missteps and irregularities, leaving both stability and legitimacy in doubt.

In 2019, Cambodia saw long-ruling Prime Minister Hun Sen tighten his grip on power. Economic growth continued, but with rising risks related to a real estate bubble, mounting debt, and yawning social inequality. Externally, Cambodia deepened its dependency on China, insulating the Hun Sen regime in some respects but contributing to new vulnerabilities.

The Duterte administration has facilitated a new autonomous arrangement in Muslim Mindanao, and congressional allies passed some popular laws. In the midterms, Duterte-backed candidates dominated both national and local elections. However, the promised charter change has floundered, economic growth has been tempered, and the drug war has not succeeded.

Myanmar’s international pariah status has deepened with the filing of three separate international lawsuits against the country in November 2019 regarding atrocities against the Rohingya people. Economic forecasts indicate that the economy is on the right track but local business progress remains sluggish. The peace process has stalled, and armed conflict continues in some major cities, with increasing numbers displaced. The government's focus on the Rohingya crisis and amending the constitution are likely aimed to rally domestic support for the election scheduled for 2020.

Climate disruptions highlighted factors likely to shape the contours of climate change in Laos. Among these, regional relationships and resource-driven development continued to be important, as did inequality within Laos. Popular dissatisfaction with the capacity of the Lao state continued, exacerbated by environmental disasters and continuing limitations on free speech.

In 2019, Singapore celebrated its bicentennial and reflected on its journey from a British colony engaged in entrepôt trade to a successful sovereign state anchored in ASEAN. The ruling party announced that Finance Minister Heng Swee Keat will be Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s successor. Presumably, Heng will play a key leadership role for his party in Singapore’s upcoming general election.

Politically, the focus in Timor-Leste in 2019 shifted from infighting to crucial decision-making on petroleum exploitation. Contrary to international advice on risk management and the need to diversify the non-oil economy, a going-for-broke mindset with respect to a multi-billion-dollar onshore gas development appeared to have carried the day.

The major development in India in 2019 was the national election which returned Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party to power with a larger majority and which, along with post-election ideological assertiveness, poses the question of whether India’s party system is a new one-party hegemony, this time of the Bharatiya Janata.

Relatively prudent foreign policy maneuvers stole the headlines in 2019, overshadowing Pakistan’s downward economic spiral and political decay. The Imran Khan government made the most of extra-regional strategic opportunities with the US and China while weathering a collapsing bilateral relationship with India. Officials struggled to arrest a mounting economic crisis. The state further accelerated the long-term corrosion of Pakistan’s political institutions with threats to federalism, suppression of opposition elements, and greater space for the military at the expense of civilians.