Long considered a smoker’s paradise, Japan passed its strictest regulations yet on indoor smoking in 2018 with revisions to the Health Promotion Law and a new ordinance in Tokyo. Timed for the Tokyo Olympics, both reforms made smoking regulations stronger and more legalistic despite reflecting distinctive policy paradigms in their particulars. The national regulations curtailed smoking in many public spaces but accommodated smoking in small restaurants and bars. Tokyo’s stronger restrictions emphasized public health protection by exempting only eateries with no employees. I argue that fully understanding these contemporaneous reforms requires analyzing insider activists: state actors who participated in the tobacco control movement or had sustained interaction with it during earlier reform waves. Case studies drawing on interviews and movement and government documents illustrate the mechanisms insider activists can access because they straddle multiple fields. This article contributes to scholarship about ideas, policy entrepreneurship, and the blurry line between insiders and outsiders in policymaking.

Research has shown that major international events can produce a “rally ’round the flag” effect that boosts citizens’ support for an American president. This study examines such an effect in Taiwan, when the country was confronted by the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that citizens who previously disapproved of the president did become more likely to gather around their leader. The public’s support was contingent on the president’s ability to handle the crisis. This is one of the few studies on this effect conducted outside the US, and its findings represent a significant step toward broadening the scope of analysis.

The Chinese Communist Party has been surprisingly successful in carrying out its plans in the face of various challenges in the post-Mao era. Compared to their central counterparts, the operating patterns of local institutions in tackling such difficulties have been less examined. This paper aims to fill this gap by exploring the party’s management of provincial standing committees (PSCs). As the highest level of local collective leadership, the PSC essentially sets the agenda for the province. Using a new database of PSC members from 1980 to 2016, this study provides a systematic illustration of the historical composition of provincial collective leadership. Instead of making drastic changes, the party has subtly shifted the roles of provincial leaders: it has redefined the role of the vice party secretary, adjusted the number of posts in the provincial government, and raised the level of professionalism.

This article applies Distelhorst and Fu’s (2019) typology of citizenship performances to an original sample of 200 online Mayor’s Mailbox letters to examine how scripts of citizenship differ between richer and poorer areas of China. Using a mixed-methods approach, I find that letters in more developed areas are significantly less likely to present the writer as a submissive subject, but no more likely to frame complaints in terms of rights and legality. I also find that many letter writers behave as “constructive citizens” by stressing their interest in helping the authorities improve local governance. These findings challenge linear understandings of the value shift that follows development, and suggest that the focus on contention in the literature on citizenship under authoritarianism overlooks other, more cooperative forms of political participation in consolidated autocracies.

Research on the relationship between international economic and political relations has produced no consensus on the pacifying effects of trade. Rapid trade growth and enduring tensions characterize post–Cold War Asia’s paradox. This study assesses the political effects of China-centered interdependence based on the China–South Korea case since 1992. Although trade may inhibit conflict in line with liberal expectations, its coercive potential limits its pacifying effects. When disputes arise, asymmetric interdependence generates strategic leverage and vulnerability, and amplifies the identity dimensions of conflict that shape societal preferences. China’s combination of economic pressure and nationalist discourse induces accommodation primarily through coercion. By blending state-led and society-led retaliation, economic and accountability costs are minimized. China–South Korea political interactions have increased in quantity but not quality. The Asian case underscores qualitative changes in political relations (rather than just instances of conflict), the material and nonmaterial repercussions of asymmetric trade, and the regional security implications of China-led interdependence.

In the foreign direct investment (FDI) literature, studies show that investors prefer low-risk host states. However, the research focuses on investors from developed country democracies, such as the United States, ignoring the rise of China, an authoritarian developing country that engages in public and private investment. This paper investigates Chinese state and private FDI in 127 developing countries from 2003 to 2017 to determine the effects of political risk on FDI. We find that, as with US FDI, low-risk developing countries attract more Chinese state FDI, except in the case of natural resource investment, where Chinese investors appear to disregard risk concerns. For Chinese private FDI, on the other hand, political institutions seem to play no significant role, but political affiliations matter. Our work suggests that similarities between US and Chinese state FDI are increasing, while the investment strategies of Chinese private and state firms appear to be growing farther apart.

The political reforms that have been going on since the 1990s have drastically changed the face of politics in Japan. The most significant of these reforms was the change of government, which brought an end, albeit only once, to the long-standing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) regime. These changes were expected to change the power structure by altering the contact of interest groups with political elites. I examine this issue based on a longitudinal survey conducted in four rounds between 1997 and 2017. The results show a robust structure of interest group politics, although the features were weakening. That is, contacts with the LDP and the bureaucracy were sources of political influence for interest groups. The impact of the two-party system and its setbacks are seen in the change in contact with the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). However, The DPJ did not function as a source of interest representation.

Many democracies start with aspirations to rectify wrongs that occurred under the preceding authoritarian regime. To what extent can a new democracy address political repression and violence by dictators, given that key actors from the past often remain politically powerful? What determines the success of those efforts? We construct and analyze a novel data set on 102 retrials of allegedly fabricated espionage cases in South Korea to explain the political conditions under which a democratic judiciary reverses past errors. We find that the time since democratization, a leader’s policy drive for transitional justice, and the degree of fabrication in the past all affect retrial acquittal rates. We also find that judges who were appointed under the authoritarian regime are less likely to nullify past verdicts. Furthermore, national survey analysis suggests that the overturning of past fabricated verdicts significantly enhances citizens’ overall trust in the judiciary.

India is the recipient of substantial aid flows but also a nuclear-armed power and an emerging donor. Why have developed countries provided aid to one of the fastest-growing major economies in the world? Answering this question requires understanding the underlying determinants of these aid flows. Using data from 1960 to 2015, the domestic conditions of India and the external conditions of donors are empirically explored with time-series analysis and panel-data analysis. We find that during the Cold War India received more foreign aid from donors with a larger volume of trade and arms transfers, but from 2000 to 2015 the effect of arms transfers declined while countries with high trade volumes continued to give more aid. Although these findings broadly support the realist interpretation of aid, we conclude that post–Cold War structural shifts in the international aid regime and defense industries need to be considered by future researchers.

Ever since the concept of soft power was introduced, there has been debate about what it is and how it works. We join the debate by studying how the success of Korean cultural products in Taiwan has improved the relationship between South Korea and Taiwan. The two countries normalized their relationship in 1948 and maintained cooperation until the severance of formal ties in 1992 because of South Korea’s rapprochement with China. Beginning in early 2000, however, South Korea’s cultural products have enjoyed great success in Taiwan. Since that time, the relationship between the two countries has significantly improved, including trade and tourism expansion, increased Taiwanese direct investment in South Korea, and policy changes by Taiwan’s government. These changes provide empirical evidence of soft power.

In May 2018 the Malaysian governing coalition Pakatan Harapan (PH) lost in national elections for the first time since independence. But the subsequent reform process came to a sudden halt in February 2020. During transitions, unpredictability and risks for political actors are higher, and political conditions are extremely volatile. Multiparty coalitions such as PH have trouble sustaining the cohesion that was instrumental in their electoral victory. The highly polarized environment and the differing strategic calculations of PH coalition partners after the elections prompted the early downfall of the government. At the same time, the opposition, weakened shortly after the transitional elections, increased its cohesiveness and mobilized its supporters against the government in an environment of deep ethnoreligious cleavages. This paper traces the reform successes and failures of the PH government as well as the reconsolidation and strengthening of the new opposition, up to the emergence of the new Perikatan Nasional government.

We adopt a game theory approach that considers democratization as the result of strategic interactions between government and nongovernment actors in East and Southeast Asia, and test the implications systematically with data from South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. This makes three contributions to scholarship. First, the synergy of a game theory framework based on area studies information draws attention to the conditions under which players’ threats or actions are credible, to support inclusive theory-building. Second, the consistent findings across East and Southeast Asian countries often cited as critical cases on opposite sides of larger debates in the discipline, and across different operationalizations of democratization, support the idea that democratization occurs under weak economic conditions. Third, our rigorous tests beyond regime change-over, and across empirically derived heuristics of time span, fill theoretical and empirical lapses in order to adjudicate democratization in the region and provide a clear theoretical and empirical lens for current and future analyses.

In recent years, the economic development of China and India and their border confrontations have intensified bilateral strategic competition. This study used the State of Democracy in South Asia survey to identify dual mindsets of competition and contingency that drive how Indians perceive China’s influence in Asia. These two mindsets are based on a cognitive schema characterized by a political predisposition against China. However, this negative orientation is moderated as more information is acquired regarding the impact of China on India. The competition mindset does not always manifest itself, and is only cognitively activated when a change is perceived in India’s power status. On the other hand, the contingent principle appears whenever competition seems to have abated, or disadvantage seems unavoidable. The mindsets of competition and contingency are not only relevant to the evolution of Sino–Indian relations, but also explain how Indian policymakers behave and respond in international society.

North Korea slogged through 2020 in an effort to maintain public health and state power. Kim Jong Un’s hopes for an economic breakthrough were dashed by the COVID-19 outbreak in neighboring China, which posed an existential threat given the DPRK’s limited healthcare resources. Although swift sealing of borders helped prevent a crisis, keeping the country on national quarantine took a heavy toll. Information about internal developments was scarce this year, as demonstrated by the global media’s frenzied speculation in the spring that Kim Jong Un had died. Kim did scale down his public appearances, but convened frequent sessions of the ruling Politburo, often to complain about Party failings, and his sister Kim Yo Jong elevated her profile with tough messages for Seoul and Washington. North Korea remained inwardly focused to the end of the year, rebuffing South Korean entreaties at cooperation and ignoring the presidential election in the United States.

Japan’s leaders began 2020 with grand ambitions to make it a historic year. Tokyo was set to welcome the world for the Summer Olympics, Japan’s first since 1964, and Abe Shinzō, the powerful prime minister, planned to realize his party’s 65-year-old dream: revising Japan’s never-amended, US-drafted 1947 constitution. By spring, however, it was clear that COVID-19 had other plans. Despite public health outcomes better than in any other G7 member, daily life was severely disrupted, and the domestic political and economic fallout for Japan was significant. By late summer, circumstances were improving, but both Abe’s popularity and his personal health had suffered. He resigned in September, ending the longest prime-ministership in Japanese history. Though COVID-19 and the end of the Abe Era were the major storylines of Japan in 2020, a subplot was, paradoxically, remarkable continuity in national politics and foreign affairs.

The biggest stories of the year 2020 were the COVID-19 pandemic and a trade dispute between the United States and China. The pandemic significantly damaged the Asian economies. The US-China trade war halted after a phase one trade deal and the pandemic, but the future is unclear.

In 2020, Cambodia experienced its sharpest economic contraction in more than a quarter-century as COVID-19 crippled its tourism industry, hampered foreign investment, and reduced demand for exports from its crucial garment and textile sectors. Wary of simmering popular unrest, the government of long-serving Prime Minister Hun Sen sought to support the battered economy with one hand while stifling domestic political dissent with the other. Domestic crackdowns brought further erosion of Cambodia’s ties with the European Union, and relations with the United States and some Southeast Asian neighbors remained tense as Cambodia drifted closer into a dependent relationship with China.

In 2020, the United States sought to implement its policy of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific to address the challenge of a rising China. US–China antagonism increased, spurred on by economic tensions and concerns for Beijing’s actions with respect to Hong Kong, Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Uighurs, with all this occurring in the context of the global pandemic. As the Trump administration came to a close, the most pressing question was how the turn to great power competition, which intensified in 2020, would evolve under a Biden administration.

The NLD was reelected in 2020 with more seats than it won in 2015. Myanmar’s transition is not regressing, but many priorities remain before the state truly democratizes: conducting transparent trials of military officers who were involved in the killings of Rohingyas, solving the conflict between the Arakan Army and the Tatmadaw in Rakhine State, ensuring that enduring armed conflicts do not undermine citizens’ ability to vote, making sure the National Ceasefire Agreement prevents the resurgence of old animosities, demilitarizing the constitution, and restraining the military’s ability to sue opposition for defamation.