The Impact of the Ukraine War on Russian–North Korean Relations

The Russia–Ukraine war has been raging for more than six months, with no end in sight. The impact of the war will mark a turning point by accentuating the end of the post–Cold War peace. This study focuses on the impact of the war on Russian–North Korean relations to understand the ripple effect of the war beyond Europe, given the decline of globalization in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and intensifying US–China rivalry.

From the beginning, North Korea’s reaction to the war was different from that of the rest of the world: it showed no immediate response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It was only on February 27, three days after the invasion began, that North Korea broke its silence. Rather than blaming Russia, the commentary identified the root cause of the war as the one-sided expansion of NATO, seen as a threat to Russia (Dong-A Ilbo 2022). As background for the war, it pointed to US pursuit of hegemony based on military superiority and arrogance. It further contended that Russia’s rational thinking and just demands had been ignored. North Korea, a champion of territorial integrity, noninterference in domestic affairs, and national sovereignty under the banner of juch’e (self-reliance), must have found it hard to reconcile these principles with Russia’s blatant violation of territorial integrity.

North Korea’s support of Russia was reflected in its voting at the UN. North Korea was one of just five countries (along with Belarus, Eritrea, Syria, and Russia) that voted against the General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (142 nations out of 193 were in favor, with China abstaining). North Korea continued to support Russia’s position after the UN vote (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2022). In his speech at an emergency session of the UN General Assembly, Kim Song, North Korean ambassador to the UN, said that “the US and the West, in defiance of Russia’s reasonable and just demand to provide it with legal guarantee for security, have systematically undermined the security environment of Europe by becoming more blatant in their attempts to deploy attack weapon systems while pursuing NATO’s eastward expansion” (quoted in Korea Herald 2022). North Korea also voted against the resolution to suspend Russia from its seat on the UN Human Rights Council (UN News 2022). And it was one of the three countries that recognized the two breakaway republics of Donetsk and Luhansk in Ukraine (Los Angeles Times 2022).

For its part, Russia had supported North Korea’s newly intensified missile launches since the beginning of 2022 (Al Jazeera 2022a). The Russian Foreign Ministry announced that Russia understood North Korea’s decision to renew its frequent missile launches and saw no reason not to restart Korean denuclearization talks (RIA News 2022). The ministry blamed the United States for continuing unilateral sanctions against North Korea without considering North Korea’s previous year and a half of compliance with a moratorium on nuclear tests and missile launches. It is not surprising, then, that Russia joined China in opposing a statement condemning North Korea’s intercontinental missile tests (BBC News Korea 2022). Anna Evstigneva, Russian deputy ambassador to the UN, said that both sides were responsible for the lack of progress in North Korea–US negotiations (Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations 2022). And regarding the US pursuit of additional sanctions against North Korea at the UN Security Council, Russia said it would oppose any measure that aggravates the situation on the Korean Peninsula (Nikkei Asia 2022).

Thus, the close cooperation between Russia and North Korea has continued since the latest escalation of the Ukraine war. North Korea’s measured response can only be understood when the historical background of its relations with Russia is considered. As the collapse of the Soviet Union demonstrated, changes in Russia’s international status have direct bearings on and set parameters for North Korea’s international behavior. Thus Russia’s changing posture toward the US has a direct bearing on North Korea’s stance toward the US. Russian–Chinese relations are another key variable in the policy orientation of North Korea. North Korea has maintained a delicate balance between these two big neighbors. Finally, changes in Russia’s position and status at the global and regional levels will also affect its perception and policy with respect to the Korean Peninsula.

This is not merely because Russia is directly involved in the war but also because it is qualitatively different from most other nation-states, which do not strive for superpower status (Baev 2008, 32–41). Often this Russian quest for greatness is expressed in terms such as “great power,” “empire,” or “civilization” (40). It is clear that the current war will affect Russia’s status in world politics, depending on how it ends. Particularly relevant is the impact of the war on Russian–Chinese relations, which in turn have strongly affected North Korea’s foreign policy.

Here, we consider the impact of the Ukraine war on Russian–North Korean relations at three levels: world power configurations; East Asia and Sino–Russian relations; and bilateral Russian–North Korean relations. At the international level we consider the emerging world order in the aftermath of the Ukraine war and North Korea’s perception of this order. We look at the status of Russia in the new order, and at North Korea’s assessment of Russia’s role and influence in the new international context. In terms of specific issue areas, we closely consider the impact of the war on the prospects for the denuclearization of North Korea. At the regional level, we focus on the opportunities and limitations that will arise for North Korea from strengthened Sino–Russian relations, and the impact of the war on the security environment of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. At the bilateral level, we analyze the impact of the war on Russia’s political and economic relations with North Korea, South Korea, and Japan in terms of change and continuity.

There seems to be a consensus that the Ukraine war will bring a tectonic change to the post–Cold War peace and European security. In the following, we analyze various hotly debated visions of the emerging world order, considering the status and role of Russia in each one. We then analyze each vision in terms of its implications for Russian–North Korean relations.

In one view, the war has both highlighted and deepened the fundamental global cleavage of today—the clash between advanced democracies that are committed to the existing international order and a nascent bloc of Eurasian autocratic solidarity, that of Russia and China, trying to overturn it (Leonard 2022; Mead 2022).

This view has a distinctly ideological perspective on the Russia–Ukraine war. The stakes of this war entail the defense of democracy against autocracy and totalitarianism (White House 2022). This is closely related to the view that the most challenging issue of the world is to preserve democracy, which respects individual human rights at home while observing international laws—which in turn is predicated on national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Putin, on this view, committed egregious violations of the principle of international law (Youngs 2022).

At the same time, those who advocate value alliance among world democracies maintain that the Ukraine war shattered the false expectation that engagement with Russia and China will bring about liberalization in those countries. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine provided a “historic opportunity” to regroup and reload for an era of intense competition, not just with Russia but also with China” among democratic states (Beckley and Brands 2022). This view asserts that the liberal coalition should not fail to take advantage of the current opportunity to build strong military forces to defend against pressure and aggression from autocracies. The US strategic goal lies in building an international coalition of democracies and confronting Russia and China with proper military preparedness to fend off these states’ aggressive behaviors.

The structure and operation of the value-based alliance could take different forms. A value alliance could be formed around the US, with major democracies like Germany and Japan closely following US leadership. In another form, regional centers like Germany and Japan could play a more autonomous role, especially in their respective regions (Europe and Asia). In the latter case, a profound change in regional security order would follow, and more cooperative security relations would emerge between the US, Germany, and Japan. The long-term hierarchical order would change as US regional allies are treated more as stakeholders (Leonard 2022).

Relations with Russia will depend on how Russia emerges from the Ukraine war. If Russia continues to be under authoritarian rule, there will be only limited engagements in the areas of arms control, nuclear nonproliferation, and cyber-security. Most likely the war will not end with a clear defeat for Russia, and thus Putin domestically can claim victory. This suggests the authoritarian system in Russia will continue for the foreseeable future.

The postwar international order is not likely to fit either the value alliance model or the realists’ picture. If the former posits that the world is divided according to ideology, values, and political systems, the latter emphasizes the recognition of spheres of influence, including that of Russia, and national interest as determining factors in national strategic thinking. In the context of US–Russian relations, Russia should not be permitted to tilt too closely toward China (Chotiner 2022; Mead 2022). Thus the world order is going to be a mixture of value alliance and realism.

Evidence for a mixed international order can be found in possible Russian–Chinese cooperation. The Ukraine war is posing a fundamental challenge to the unstable international order amid US–China rivalry and the stagnant global economy due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Russia is challenging the liberal international order that the US is pursing. Some say Russia is pursuing a multipolar world, but on closer examination it is clear that Russia is pursuing a multiregional world order (Shin 2003), comparable to the multisectorial security complexes proposed by Buzan (2003). The stability of this world order is based on the mutual recognition of spheres of influence and maintaining a balance of power at regional and international levels (Acharya 2017, 49–52). Russia wants to secure its own status as a major power in Eurasia and as a stakeholder in the Middle East and the periphery of Eurasia, like Northeast Asia (Makarychev and Morozov 2011).

Russia’s worldview smacks of imperialism and thus can be seen as challenging to the liberal world order the US is leading. However, Russia’s goal in pursuing its own vision of international order is not so much to challenge the US-led order; it is more defensive, in protecting its own interests as a major power in Eurasia. The “return of geopolitics” noted by both Mead (2014) and Almqvist and Linklater (2022), which has drawn attention since the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, is related to Russia’s new strategic vision.

The Ukraine war is part of Russia’s effort to secure its sphere of influence in Europe. And Russia’s position could be useful for China in its strategic competition with the US. This is the backdrop for Russian–Chinese strategic cooperation since the end of the Cold War. The cooperation is closely based on the convergence of interests of the two major powers in the region. Russia and China respect each other’s sphere of influence in Eurasia and have been jointly countering the US (Alexander Lukin 2019). China’s demand for “great power relations” with the US is based on the relationship China had been building up with Russia (China Power 2022). Despite some concerns regarding a clash of interests over Central Asia, the two countries have thus far avoided conflict with each other and have collaborated on maintaining regional security cooperation (Maizland 2022).

Thus there is a big difference between the international order Russia and China are pursuing and the value-based alliance the US is leading. Some predict that competition and conflict between the two camps will give rise to a New Cold War (Abrams 2022; Kuzmarov 2019). Confrontation between the West and Russia since the Ukraine war broke out gives credence to this view. The US and Western European and other liberal states have condemned Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine and joined in sanctions against Russia. Some see this as related to the US policy of decoupling from China to reduce economic interdependence. The US-led sanction measures against Russia are also viewed as an attempt to separate Western liberal market economies from the state capitalism of Russia and China. The prevailing view is that the decoupling will be possible only in limited areas, like high-tech industries. Still, there are emerging concerns that competition for regional spheres of influence and confrontation in economic areas could lead to a situation comparable to the US–Soviet Cold War.

What is noteworthy is the emergence of new international phenomenon. One example is “the Rest—the non-Western world” (Stent 2022), which is participating in the global market economy with limited accommodation of Western liberal democracy. For these countries, it is not easy to forgo economic interdependence (and energy dependence) with Russia. Half of the members of the G20 did not participate in sanctions against Russia. India, one of the pillars of the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), which was formed to deter China (Iwanek 2022), did not join the sanctions. Thus, unlike the old Cold War, the New Cold War world may not be completely bipolarized; it may become a fluid, unstable, incompletely bipolar confrontation, where competition and cooperation alternate in an uncertain environment (Depetris and Menon 2022; Funabashi 2022).

The emerging world order will have the following implications for Russian–North Korean relations. Most importantly, North Korea will find a new international identity in the newly emerging Eurasian alignment among China, Russia, and North Korea. North Korea has not had the sense of belonging in international politics since the end of the Cold War. The significance of the sense of belonging will only increase in the ever more uncertain postwar international environment. Most important for North Korea under the newly emerging world order is a common anti-US stance among the three countries. North Korea can expect support from Russia in dealing with the US (Lankov 2020). Perhaps due to this expectation of a new international identity, North Korea has demonstrated strong support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The implications of postwar Russia’s foreign policy for international politics are clear. Russia’s policy orientation will shift to Eurasia, as Russia will be isolated from the West and the Euro-Atlantic world. Transcending the former USSR and the post-Soviet area, Greater Eurasia is a continent-wide vision, promoting political and economic cooperation between states and nations from the Atlantic to the Pacific, including China, India, Pakistan, Vietnam, and Korea. In this vision, China is the primary partner of Russia in strongly opposing the unipolar world led by the US/West, or Euro-Atlanticism (Glaser and Thomann 2022, 5–6). Russia will focus its multivector diplomacy on China in confronting the US-led quasi-value alliance, and also will promote economic cooperation among the BRICS (Lukin 2020).

The US has been trying to check Russia and China through NATO and by building an international alignment based on liberalism and democracy. It also has been trying to strengthen security cooperation between Europe and Asia. It remains to be seen whether the world can restore principles to international relations under the leadership of the US, or whether Russian–Chinese strategic cooperation will instead check the intention of the US, leading to a more fragmented world order. Thus the nature and extent of Russian–Chinese strategic cooperation will be critical in shaping the international order after the Ukraine war. Russia and China’s strategic cooperation has evolved over time, from coordinated strategic cooperation in the 2000s, through convergent strategic cooperation in the 2010s, to presently comprehensive strategic cooperation (Shin, 2022). Arguably, the two countries have been successful in creating a coexisting Eurasian regional order centering around Central Asia, with three goals in mind: maintaining political stability (no one wants political eruptions that could bring radical Islamist movements to power); maintaining the power of secular regimes; and accelerating the economic development of countries in the region as the only political basis for stability (Alexander Lukin 2019, 7–8). They have been cooperating to create a multipolar world and trying to build a balance among multiregional orders. At the bilateral level the two countries maintain strategic cooperation and work toward the emergence of Greater Eurasia, based on Sino–Russian entente (8–12).

Russia’s policy shift will most likely affect its relations with North Korea (Artyom Lukin 2019, 22). Most importantly, North Korea is likely to welcome this change in world politics as it finds a new grouping, which it lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union (Frank 2022). Russia and North Korea will share similar perspectives on world politics, the gist of which is an anti-American posture. One Russian commentary called for greater Eurasian unity among Russia, China, and North Korea, in opposition to the aggressive ambitions of the US.¹ Kim Jung Un himself said, in his telegram to Russian President Putin celebrating the 77th anniversary of liberation from Japanese colonial rule:

The nascent Russia–China–North Korea strategic cooperation will constitute a core alignment in Russia’s Eastern Eurasian policy. Putin recently offered partners and allies the most modern types of weapons at an arms show outside Moscow. He pointed out that Russia supports its allies who are bravely resisting Western hegemonic power in pursuit of a multipolar system. North Korea certainly seems to be included among these allies (Al Jazeera 2022b). Although China and Russia commonly consider North Korea as a security buffer zone against the US threat and thus jointly support it, they differ in their degree of cooperation with North Korea. North Korea is an essential part of China’s sphere of influence in pursuit of regional hegemony, and thus China is Pyongyang’s chief patron. Russia has limited economic resources in the region and thus cannot compete with China. Furthermore, North Korea lacks appeal to Russia’s most powerful vested interests, compared to other parts of Eurasia. Russia defers to China on issues related to the Korean Peninsula, though this hurts Moscow’s great-power pride a little. Russia appears to have chosen to refrain from balancing China in East Asia, leaving it to China to deter the US and its allies (Alexander Lukin 2019, 27–28).

The tightening of relations between Russia and North Korea will manifest in several ways. At the regional level, Russia may find it difficult to play a conduit role between North Korea and the US, given the strained relations with the latter and Russia’s tilting toward China in the aftermath of the Ukraine war. Also, Russia will not be able to maintain a policy of equidistance between North and South Korea, as the latter is now more closely aligned with the US and NATO due to the war (Kashin 2020; Smith 2022). However, Russia’s influence in Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula, though it is limited, cannot be ignored, especially in security mechanisms in Northeast Asia, including offensive missiles and missile defense systems and matters related to changes in the status of the Korean Peninsula. This is because Russia still has significant influence in the region and its regional policy remains largely independent of China, although it is limited (Kashin 2020). Under the new international environment after the Ukraine war, Russia is likely to take North Korea’s side on important issues, such as denuclearization (Jeong-Ho Lee 2022).

However, it is not clear whether Russia would completely give its economic engagement with Northeast Asia. There seems to be a concern in Russia that with closer economic ties with China, Russia’s economic relations with other Asian partners, including South Korea, may be affected. South Korea still holds out hope for help from Russia in building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula by resolving North Korean nuclear issues. Thus, it is unlikely that Russia and South Korea will burn their economic bridges (Kapoor 2020; Rinna 2019). However, a different situation may develop. South Korea’s new Yoon government has adopted a policy of strengthening its relationship with the US (Snyder 2022b). If this is combined with the worsened relationship between Russia and Japan since the outbreak of the Ukraine war, tensions will arise in Northeast Asia in addition to the tensions related to China (Choong 2022; Kim and Harris 2022; Lkhaajav 2022).

Russia will then confront a new situation on the regional and peninsular levels. Northeast Asia will retrench into a Cold War–like security bifurcation between the US–Japan–South Korea alignment and the China–Russia–North Korea coalition. And this is likely to shift Russian policy with respect to the region and the Peninsula. Russia has tried to maintain independent policies to make its presence felt in the region, although they have not played a decisive role, given Russia’s limited means (Lankov 2020).

For example, Russia has proposed new joint railroad and gas pipeline projects for Russia, North Korea, and South Korea. However, they have not produced visible success, due to North Korean nuclear issues. The new situation is likely to bring about changes in Russian policy. Its increasing dependence on China and its interest in a multipolar and multiregional world will lead Russia to favor China in competition with the US. Russia’s relations with Japan will be more rigid with respect to territorial issues. Russia’s equidistance policy toward South and North Korea may need some adjustments. Russia’s strategic interest in North Korea will be sharpened, and its support for North Korea will expand and intensify (Artyom Lukin 2019; Rinna 2019; Smith 2022).

The nature of Sino–Soviet relations has been a prominent if not the most important factor in North Korea’s foreign policy, as clearly shown in North Korea’s equidistance policy toward the two socialist giants during the 1960s and 1970s (Seth 2007). In the following, we analyze the implications of the Russian–Chinese relations emerging from the war in terms of their implications for North Korea (Minegishi 2022).

There are differing views on the nature of Russian–Chinese relations in terms of mutual perceptions and the degree of solidarity and durability (Gabuev 2015; Kaczmarski 2017; Lo 2016). One view is that the foundation is not solid, and thus bilateral relations are nothing but a marriage of convenience. The two countries, though they shared some nostalgia for the communist past, have become fundamentally different, in that Russia feels victimized by the international system while China has benefited from it (Liik 2021). The other view sees a compelling rationale for mutual support against the US threat. Russia’s need for China has been further consolidated since Russia’s takeover of Crimea in 2014, and China needs Russia’s support in its rivalry with the US. China also needs access to Russian energy sources and other raw materials for its industrialization. On this view, the shared interests of the two countries will be unchanged even after the Russia–Ukraine war (Goldstein 2022; Lubina 2017).

But whether or not Russian–Chinese relations are based on convenience, the two views agree that the Chinese–Russian alignment will continue for a considerable time, even after the war, as long as global geopolitics are largely structured by hegemonic competition between China and the US (Lubina 2017; Minegishi 2022). North Korea has to take this into account in its strategic thinking. What is clear for North Korea is that unlike in the 1960s and 1970s, there will be little room for maneuver between the two giant neighbors. The fact that the three countries share a common international outlook in terms of the US threat will lay the ground for policy affinity in rejecting US unilateralism and aggressive postures (Minegishi 2022; Seth 2007). At the same time, due to the strained relationship between the US on the one hand and Russia and China on the other, North Korea might be hard-pressed to approach the US on its own initiatives, increasing the likelihood of brinkmanship diplomacy, as seen in the failed Hanoi deal attempted by North Korea (Rozman 2022). However, such a bold movement by North Korea is not likely any time soon. Rather, for now, North Korea is preparing to confront the US (Christy Lee 2022).

However, these three countries may not always share the same perspective on issues related to the Korean Peninsula. Russia and China have shown a consistent pattern in their approach to Korean issues, with an emphasis on stability. This focus may not be always shared by North Korea (Frohman, Rafaelof, and Dale-Huang 2022, 9–11). China and Russia counter the US and South Korea’s military threat with joint military exercises, but they will not support unilateral provocative behavior by North Korea. China and Russia will be critical of military reinforcement, whether conventional or nuclear, by the US, Japan, and South Korea in the quasi–Cold War regional environment, but they may also oppose North Korea’s flexing of its nuclear muscles for coercive diplomacy toward South Korea, as this invites further nuclear deterrence measures against all three countries by the US (Frohman, Rafaelof, and Dale-Huang 2022, 9–11; Lukin and Toloraya 2017; Vorontsov 2013).

The following changes are likely in the new international environment after the end of the Ukraine war. At the regional level, Russia does not have the influence or means to affect situations in Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula, yet it has tried to make its presence known, given its limited resources (Rozman 2022). In economic areas, North Korea will benefit from close Russian–Chinese relations. Further isolated from the rest of the world, North Korea’s dependence will increase. Russia can provide energy at concessionary prices (Frohman, Rafaelof, and Dale-Huang 2022; Christy Lee 2022). Overall, prospects for the improvement of the North Korean economy through reforms will likely become increasingly tenuous, as neither Russia nor China can provide appropriate models for the North Korean economy. Also, the two countries cannot meet the political and security needs that North Korea has been pursuing by trying to deal directly with the US (Frohman, Rafaelof, and Dale-Huang 2022: 14; Lukin and Zakharova 2018, 259–61).

Since Putin came to power, in 2000, Russia has been trying to promote a rational image of North Korean leaders as striving for survival, while frequently disputing the exaggerated interpretations of nuclear program development in North Korea and the perceived threat of North Korea in the US and beyond (Bazhanov 2005; Lukin and Toloraya 2017). Putin’s renewed interest in North Korea, driven by his diplomatic strategy of inter-Korean equidistance, was clearly seen in his visit to North Korea in 2000—it was the first country he visited as president except for the former Soviet republics (Yakubovsky 2003). Actually, Russia’s shift to the equidistance policy toward the two Koreas started under Yeltsin, when he appointed Primakov foreign minister in the mid-1990s. Nonetheless, it was Putin who actually ran and pushed ahead Russia’s approach to North Korea by signing a new friendship treaty with North Korea in February 2000, in view of the latter’s role as a strategic asset in Russia’s regional and global security policy (Jeh 2012; Yakubovsky 2003). Putin’s new intention was clearly demonstrated when he brought word of North Korea’s threat perceptions and missile programs to the G8 summit in Osaka after a summit with Kim Jung Il (Berlinger 2019).

Another area of Russia’s concern has been the deployment of missile defense systems, such as THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) in South Korea (TASS 2017), and the installation of Aegis ballistic missiles in the region (Plopsky 2018). Russia strongly criticized the US plan to deploy missile defense systems in Europe, and by insisting on strategic balance aborted the deployment of such a system in Poland (Axe 2021). However, since the Ukraine war broke out, the US is reported to be planning the deployment of a new missile defense system. The issue of THAAD in Europe and Asia will thus heat up again at the end of the Ukraine war (Patteson 2022).

Also on the topic of missile defense, Russia also has a keen interest in the potential for an intermediate-range missile arms race in Northeast Asia. In the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces agreement signed in 1987 by Reagan and Gorbachev, the two countries agreed not to retain surface-to-air ballistic missiles in the 50-to-5,500 km range (US Department of State 1987). But this symbol of the end of the Cold War turned into a new dispute between Russia and the US. Eventually, the agreement was dropped (Bugos 2019). The vehement opposition of China and Russia when the US was introducing THAAD in Korea foreshadows how they will react when the US introduces offensive missiles to the territory of its Asian allies. Under such circumstances, even North Korean issues will seem of secondary importance next to the clashes of spheres of influence among major powers in Northeast Asia (Panda 2017). North Korea will cope by strengthening its relations with Russia and China. But in the new international environment, Russia may not see any benefit in consulting with the US on the Korean Peninsula. For North Korea, this would mean the loss of an advocate for its case at the international level.

The repeated failures to reach an agreement in North Korea’s denuclearization talks have left a deep sense of frustration and hopelessness; two summits between President Trump and Chairman Kim Jung Un, in 2018 and 2019, ended without tangible achievement. Knowing that the new Biden administration will not comply with its demands, North Korea has been engaged in miniaturizing nuclear warheads and improving missile launching (Bennett et al. 2021, 19–37; Davenport 2022). Given the past failures, it is not surprising to see the low-key position of the Biden administration as one of greatly diminished enthusiasm compared to the previous administration, and its caution as reflecting the difficulty of formulating new policies and approaches (Harris, Bard, and Lee 2021; Richey 2021).

The Ukraine war will reinforce North Korea’s determination to maintain and further develop its nuclear programs. As soon as the war started, a widely circulated view was that Russia could not have launched a war against Ukraine if the latter had not given up the nuclear weapons it inherited from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. In fact, Ukraine’s politicians and military abandoned these nuclear weapons almost voluntarily, in return for a security guarantee from Russia, the US, and Great Britain in the Budapest Memorandum in 1994. Thus, the Ukraine war has cast new doubt on the prospects for nuclear nonproliferation, in that more non-nuclear states are likely to contemplate pursuing nuclearization. In the Asian context, proponents of nuclearization have been making their voices stronger as the nuclear threat from North Korea has steadily grown (Carlson 2022). The gloomy prospect that the Ukraine war will be a turning point toward the intensification of nuclear arms competition throughout the world is likely to gain more attention. Equally seriously, the war must have convinced North Korea’s leaders of the value of its nuclear weapons programs. And their conviction must be that much stronger because unlike Ukraine, which inherited its nuclear weapons, North Korea has developed nuclear weapons on its own without much outside interference. Besides, the war must have reminded them of the coldness of international politics, where yesterday’s friend can turn into tomorrow’s enemy so suddenly and fluidly. Equally important is that Kim must have learned an important lesson on the efficacy of nuclear weapons through Putin’s allusion to the use of tactical nuclear weapons against NATO at the early stage of the war (Lee and Bischke 2022).

Russia’s position on North Korea’s denuclearization has been consistent but distinctly different from that of the US. As an original member of the UN Security Council and a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Russia is strongly committed to nonproliferation, and North Korea is not an exception (Lukin and Toloraya 2017). Yet Russia does not regard a nuclear North Korea as the foremost security concern. Russia is more concerned about the collapse of the North Korean regime, which could gravely threaten Russian security interests with a hostile US presence just over the border, an influx of North Korean refugees, the possible outbreak of another Korean war, and so on (Blank 2017 Dyachkov et al. 2017). This distinctive Russian position has been consistently shown when Russia has supported the sanction measures taken by the UN Security Council (e.g., Resolution 1718 2006) but tried to water them down in the process of implementation.

Furthermore, Russia does not believe that sanctions will solve the North Korean nuclear problem. Russia has been consistent in in its efforts toward negotiations and multilateral dialogue. Russia maintains that the isolation of North Korea will only aggravate the situation. Russia’s goals regarding North Korean nuclear issues can be summarized as follows. First, the nonproliferation system in the region should be maintained. If necessary, Russia will cooperate with the US for that purpose. Russia supports a multilateral dialogue format to resolve North Korea’s nuclear issues peacefully. Russia would like to play a leading role in promoting multilateral talks as a way to secure its geopolitical influence in the region. For the stability of Northeast Asia, Russia opposes isolation policies and blockades against North Korea. It also opposes military means of resolving North Korea’s nuclear issues, as they are likely to exacerbate instability in Northeast Asia. Russia’s ultimate goal is to secure its status as a stakeholder in Northeast Asia in the process of resolving North Korea’s nuclear issues and establishing a Northeast Asian multilateral security system and peace regime (Kim 2012; Mankoff and Barannikova 2019; Suchkov 2018).

Russia’s position on nonproliferation may not change in principle, even in the aftermath of the Ukraine war. However, Russia will take the new international and regional environment into account in approaching North Korea’s nuclear issues. Russia will decry the military joint exercises and anti-missile systems in and around the Korean Peninsula much more vociferously than before, as threatening stability, rather than blaming North Korea’s nuclear efforts. Knowing that Kim Jung Un will not give up on nuclear weapons and thus that CVID (comprehensive, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization) is not realistic, Russia and China may propose to live with “a new status quo” with a shift toward CRID (conditional, reciprocal, and incremental denuclearization). This would represent recognition of North Korea as “a lesser nuclear state” (Barannikova 2022).

The Ukraine war will reinforce North Korea’s perception that nuclear weapons are essential for national survival. Also, Putin’s threat to use tactical nuclear weapons and Kim Jung Un’s echoing of that threat do not bode well for the denuclearization of North Korea (Lee and Bischke 2022).

Aside from nuclear issues, Russia has economic interests in relation to North Korea. Putin’s New Eastern Policy, launched in 2012, was based on the recognition that Russia’s future development will be greatly affected by economic relations with Asian countries. The goal is to develop the entire Russian Far East—including the Zabaikalye region, which remains the least developed in Russia—and China has been regarded as a most important partner in this effort. However, too heavy a reliance on China might not be conducive to the creation of Russia’s own economic and strategic space. Thus it is important for Russia to strengthen relations with countries in Northeast Asia, including North Korea (Blank 2015; Lukin and Toloraya 2017; Lukin and Zakharova 2017; Rinna 2019).

Naturally, Russia has made various efforts to expand and deepen relations with Japan and South Korea. As part of these, Putin took the initiative to inaugurate the Eastern Economic Forum in 2015. Yet they have not borne much fruit. Japan has been reluctant to participate in the development of the Russian Far East due to northern territorial issues (Blank 2017, 576–79; Brown 2022). The next target is South Korea, but South Korea wants Russia to help it induce changes in North Korea. The interests of Russia, South Korea, and North Korea have converged on several proposed joint infrastructure projects, such as linking railroads, natural gas pipelines, and the Najin-Hasan joint ventures. But the results have been meager, largely because of the sanctions imposed on North Korea for its nuclear and missile developments. And from the Russian perspective, South Korea has been cautious in committing investment to the projects due to its alliance with the US (Lukin and Toloraya 2017; Lukin and Zakharova 2017; Rinna 2019; Zakharova 2019).

Under these circumstances, bilateral economic relations with North Korea have taken on a new significance. The Victory project, proposed in 2014 by Alexander Galushka, minister for the development of the Russian Far East, was the exemplar of a big joint project between Russia and North Korea. The idea was to modernize North Korea’s railroad system through work by Russian firms, repairing 3,500 kilometers of rail (60–70% of the entire network) and reconstructing and renovating tunnels and bridges over a period of 20 years. In exchange for Russia’s participation, North Korea would offer the rights to development and the sale of natural resources. Per the agreement, debt issues and transaction-clearing methods, which had been barriers to bilateral economic relations, were resolved. But these projects, too, did not make much progress due to North Korea’s nuclear provocations and North Korean–US nuclear negotiations (Shin 2020).

Trade relations between Russia and North Korea have not recovered from their drastic decline at the end of the Cold War. In 2014, the Russian side set a goal of boosting trade volume with North Korea to $1 billion by 2020, which would have been close to 10 times the volume in the 2000s. But the goal was never achieved. In 2019 trade volume was only $48 million, less than half of the original target (Lankov 2020).

The heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula and the ensuing US–North Korean summit did not facilitate the further development of Russian–North Korean trade, and the pandemic dealt it a decisive blow. According to the Russian Office of Customs, 2021 trade volume was a paltry USD 40,000, a 99% reduction from 2020’s USD 43 million. This represents one-way trade: exports from North Korea to Russia, without imports from Russia, largely due to the closing of the border under the pandemic (38 North 2021).

According to the prevailing views, after the end of Ukraine war Russia and North Korea are likely to work on expanding trade (Bernal 2022; Frank 2022; Christy Lee 2022). North Korea is likely to exploit the strengthened relations between Russia and China. But it will not be easy for North Korea to quickly improve its economic relations with Russia, or with other countries, due to domestic problems caused by the pandemic (Frank 2022).

Despite difficulties and limitations, Russia may not entirely give up its equidistance policy with respect to North and South Korea. Given Russia’s independent strategic interests in the region, its increasing strategic tilt toward China at the end of the Ukraine war is not likely to drastically alter its pursuit of trilateral cooperation among Russia, South Korea, and North Korea. And even if the trilateral cooperation faces hurdles, Russia may resume the Victory project and the Najin-Hasan joint ventures. Russia may also activate various projects with North Korea in which North Korean labor is used. Given the severe labor shortage in the Russian Far East, the North Korean labor force represents critical human resources for Russia’s regional economic development. Once these projects are implemented, Russia may extend economic cooperation with South Korea as an effort to expand its influence in Northeast Asia. In terms of military cooperation, Russia may not completely close its door on South Korea as long as South Korea does not provide offensive weapons to Russia’s current and potential enemies elsewhere or take hostile military actions against Russia.

The war in Ukraine will reshape the existing world order. Russia, in close cooperation with China, will openly challenge the Pax Americana. It is not yet clear how this new world order will ultimately affect Russian–North Korean relations. But there is no denying that Russia’s reshaped international and regional strategies after the war will affect Russian–North Korean bilateral relations. While Russia’s breakup with the US/West will sharpen, Russia is likely to make rigorous efforts to work with Indo-Pacific partners who share the vision of multipolar world order. Russia’s approach to North Korea in Northeast Asia is consistent with such a broad Indo-Pacific strategy. In this region North Korea is the only suitable strategic partner for Russia (other than China), because North Korea shares a strategic interest in resisting US dominance and the US-led unipolar world order (Mathur 2022; Saxer 2022).

Although the new international power structure will not be same as the one we saw under the Cold War, the world will be divided into the US-led liberal order and the China–Russia alignment. North Korea will belong to the latter group. This new power structure will set the parameters for North Korea’s foreign policy and serve as the basis for North Korean international identity. For North Korea, the new environment is not terribly new and will provide stronger support in dealing with the US and South Korea. North Korea is likely to take advantage of this support in more aggressive behaviors.

The closer rapprochement between Russia and China in the new international environment means North Korea will benefit economically, politically, and militarily from both Russia and China. Especially important is that North Korea is likely to pursue de facto nuclear power status and practice coercive diplomacy, especially vis-à-vis South Korea, based on nuclear weapons. The prospect of North Korea’s denuclearization will become more difficult and complicated, even if neither Russia nor China is strongly supportive of North Korea’s overly aggressive behaviors. This portends instability on the Korean Peninsula and volatility in inter-Korean relations. Russia’s relations with South Korea and Japan will be constrained by the quasi–Cold War regional order, hindering Russia’s effort to enhance its status in Northeast Asia through economic projects. This will enhance the importance of North Korea to Russia. At the bilateral level, economic relations between Russia and North Korea are likely to be strengthened. Overall, the Ukraine war will have brought insecurity, uncertainty, and instability at the international and regional levels, causing volatility in and around the Korean Peninsula, which in turn will strengthen Russian–North Korean relations.

Published online: October 14, 2022