Thailand in 2021: Demonstrations and Discord in the Depths of a Pandemic

Thailand went into 2021 as a “COVID-19 star”: the country had a comparatively low 6,690 total cases and 61 deaths.¹ Quickly setting up the Center for COVID-19 Situation Administration near the start of the pandemic, the government rapidly closed down borders, declared a state of emergency, and implemented a lockdown. A similar efficiency of a more ruthless kind was displayed by the government—led by a military-aligned party (Palang Pracharat, PPRP) ever since the last elections in 2019—in shutting down anti-government protests throughout 2020. Prime minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha was quick to arrest student leaders and charge them with sedition; other leaders more ominously simply disappeared. The dissolved Future Forward Party, with strong links to the protestors, was re-established as the Move Forward Party. However, despite a few odd accusations that the protestors were being directed by an ominous “third hand” from abroad, the political influence of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and the latest reincarnation of his political vehicle, the Pheu Thai Party (For Thais Party), seemed to step back into the shadows despite being the largest party in parliament. The political tensions underlying the protests were exacerbated by a worsening economy due to the pandemic and especially the drying-up of tourism (Ockey 2021).

Thailand faced many of the same challenges in 2021, but each to a more intense degree. The government’s efficiency in all areas took a tumble in 2021, from its handling of the pandemic to its ability to deal with public discontent, and from maintaining its coalition in parliament to jump-starting the economy. At the end of 2021, Prayuth’s government looks near the end of its rope. In contrast, the Thai citizenry have not only taken to the streets in protest, but also begun to reignite civil society. A reversion back to the 1997 electoral system also paves the way for an election that could backfire on the military government.

From COVID-19 star in 2020, by July of 2021 Thailand had plummeted to the bottom of the Nikkei COVID-19 Recovery Index in Asia (Nikkei Asia 2021a). The death toll mid-year had increased to over 1,500, from less than 100 at year-end, with over 10,000 cases a day (France24 2021). By September, there had been over 1.2 million total cases and more than 12,800 deaths as a result of the pandemic (Associated Press 2021a).

Prayuth’s handling of the pandemic increased the pressure on him to step down as the year progressed. On September 2, thousands of protestors gathered in Bangkok the day before a no-confidence motion in parliament, Prayuth’s third since the March 2019 elections (Associated Press 2021b). Prayuth survived the motion, even though only 13.1% of the population had been fully vaccinated. Within a month, however, the number had increased to 30.3%, and by the end of October, to 42.2% (Our World in Data 2021b). On November 1, Thailand opened its borders to vaccinated tourists from 63 low-risk countries (BBC 2021a). Prayuth’s government seems to be gambling that public discontent has more to do with the economic impact of the pandemic than the bungling of vaccinations throughout 2021.

In response to the government’s limited capacity to deal with the widespread effects of the pandemic, Thai civil society re-emerged as an important player in 2021. Examples of these civic associations include Bangkok Community Help, whose more than 400 volunteers deliver over 3,000 hot meals and 600 survival bags a day to the city’s most vulnerable; and Sami Will Survive, which distributes medicine, food, and oxygen, as well as providing rapid virus tests and helping secure hospital beds for those who become critically ill. The increase in civic activity throughout the country is yet another signal that the people want a larger part to play in the governance of their country (Associated Press 2021a).

Thailand’s economy continued to falter in 2021. Tourism, which accounted for 20% of the Thai economy before the pandemic, plummeted from 40 million visits in 2019 to fewer than 100,000 in the first 10 months of 2021 (Reuters 2021a). The Prayuth government is aiming to take in 1.5 trillion baht (USD 44.6 billion) total by the end of the calendar year, compared to 3.4 trillion baht (USD 101 billion) in 2019 (Associated Press 2021c). Even that modest sum would require a massive number of tourists in the last two months of 2021. Earlier in the year, the government had devised the Phuket Sandbox policy, which allowed tourists to see out their 14-day quarantine on Phuket Island—the country’s most popular destination—instead of being confined to a hotel. After that, they would be allowed travel to other parts of Thailand. But the policy had limited impact on the reopening of Thailand’s 16,000 hotels, half of which were completely closed by the end of June, with occupancy rates averaging just 6% (US News 2021). The hit to the tourism industry caused widespread job losses and economic hardship. The government passed numerous stimulus packages throughout 2021, providing cash handouts for those most affected by the economic impacts of the pandemic, but the decline in tax revenue and the increased welfare demand put enormous fiscal pressure on the budget (Reuters 2021b).

Thai exports began to recover in 2021, however, helped by trade partners’ economic recovery. In June, exports increased by 44%, the biggest monthly increase in 11 years (Royal Thai Embassy 2021). Overall, shipments rose 16% year-on-year in the first three quarters of 2021. Imports also increased 30% in September, signaling a recovery in domestic consumer spending (Reuters 2021c). The World Bank (2021) forecast 2.2% growth in GDP for 2021, a vast improvement over the 6% fall experienced in 2020.

Thailand continued to witness anti-government protests throughout 2021, a continuation of student-led demands for the military to step away from politics and for a return to full democracy. While the number of protestors hit its peak in December 2020, protests have persisted throughout 2021 with increasingly bold rhetoric against both the military and the monarchy, an institution formerly off limits in the political sphere. The reduced number of protestors can mostly be attributed to the pandemic and government quarantines, but those that did take place took on a more violent tone. Police and protestors clashed more frequently and with more intensity throughout the year. By March, police had barricaded the entry to the Grand Palace with shipping containers and were using water cannons, tear gas, and rubber bullets to disperse the crowds. Protestors responded with Molotov cocktails and burned tires (BBC 2021b).

Protests resumed again in June and continued through the rest of the year. There is no central organization for the protests, and various groups and leaders have been responsible for different events. The Free Youth group was the most active organizer and continues to push its three core demands: dissolving parliament, ending intimidation of the people, and drafting a new constitution. Human rights lawyer Arnon Nampa is perhaps the leading figure of the protests. He has openly criticized the monarchy and called for the revoking of Article 112 (the lèse-majesté law which forbids defamation, insults, or threats to the monarchy) and the transfer back of public assets that the government has handed over to King Vajiralongkorn since his succession in 2016. Arnon is now in jail on lèse-majesté charges (Reuters 2021d).

Anti-government protests have also moved away from student-led efforts centered on political reform. The group Talugas, named after its leader “Thalu” Fah and the use of tear “gas” by the police to suppress it, has gathered at the Din Daeng intersection in Bangkok every night since August 7, which is significant because it is near the prime minister’s residence. The group unabashedly uses violent measures to protest the government. They come each night armed with slingshots, firecrackers, and small explosives known as ping pong bombs. Talugas is made up of young protestors from the lowest, poorest rungs of Thai society and has been criticized by the wider student-led movement. The group illustrates how widespread dissatisfaction with the government has become (Thai PBS 2021a).

There has been limited support for the protestors from political parties, but statements from individual members of both Move Forward and Pheu Thai have aligned with some student demands. Many Thai celebrities have also expressed support for the protestors, as have a few academics. Some media outlets, such as Khaosod English and the Bangkok Post, have published editorials calling on Prayuth to resign, while avoiding discussion of other demands made by the protestors.

In an August Suan Dusit poll, 53% of the public supported the student protestors, with 54% agreeing that Prayuth should “resign or dissolve parliament,” 59% that the protestors’ actions were permitted in a democracy, 60% that the government should stop intimidating the people, and 63% that the constitution needs reforming (Bangkok Post 2021a).

The government has responded to the protests with increasing force, which Amnesty International (2021) has described as “unlawful, excessive and unnecessary.” Police have used riot gear (water cannons, tear gas, and rubber bullets) and arrested protestors, who subsequently faced a host of criminal charges. From the start of the protests in July 2020 to September 20, 2021, at least 1,341 individuals (182 of them children) have been charged with sedition, royal defamation, computer-related crime, or violation of the Public Assembly Act. In March 2021, Thai authorities proposed a draft law that would give the government the power to “arbitrarily ban [civil society] groups, invade organizations’ privacy and infringe on the rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly” (Amnesty International 2021).

Another manifestation of anti-government sentiment extending beyond Bangkok’s students has been the great number of protests and rallies outside the capital, and especially outside the Central Region that surrounds Bangkok. In the 1970s, when student protests were brutally suppressed by the military and right-wing nationalists, there was very little action in the periphery. However, this wave of demonstrations has included student protests from the numerous tertiary education institutions across the kingdom. Between January 1 and October 29, there were 403 protests outside Bangkok, including 285 outside the Central Region.² This included 79 in Chiang Mai and 49 in Khon Kaen—the two biggest cities in northern and northeastern Thailand. There were even protests across the south, even though the region voted heavily for parties in the government coalition. Protestors in the periphery included student groups, Red Shirt groups (a political movement originally formed to protest the 2006 coup), and unaffiliated civilians (ACLED 2021).

There have been several attempts to amend the constitution this year. In June, the opposition parties pushed for 14 changes to the charter, including stripping the Senate of its power to take part in selecting a premier. They were joined by three coalition parties: Bhumjaithai, Democrats, and Chartthaipattana. Other calls were made for “restoring the two-ballot electoral method, restricting the choice of prime ministerial candidates to those nominated by parties or MPs, reverting back to requiring the backing of two-fifths of parliament to launch a charter amendment bid, and better decentralisation of power” (Bangkok Post 2021b).

However, the only amendment to pass was a change to the electoral system, which reverted it to the system used under the 1997 charter that first brought Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thais) party (now Pheu Thai) to power. The military party, PPRP, was disappointed with its results in the last elections, but it is still not clear which parties this change will benefit the most. Voters will now be able to choose two different parties, one at the local level and one at the national level. In the previous election, seats from the national party list were determined by whom one voted for in the local constituency contest (Diplomat 2021).

The year saw two no-confidence motions in parliament against prime minister Prayuth Chan-ocha. In February, the charges were diverse, ranging from mismanagement of the economy and the COVID-19 crisis to human right abuses and corruption (Al Jazeera 2021). The September motion was more specific, accusing the government of failing to secure timely and adequate supplies of COVID-19 vaccines (Associated Press 2021b). With a majority in the Lower House, Prayuth comfortably defeated both motions. However, the latest vote came amid rumors that senior members of the cabinet were trying to oust Prayuth from power. Following the vote, Prayuth promptly sacked Thammanat Prompao and Narumon Pinyosinwat, and there is heavy speculation that a new election is imminent (Associated Press 2021d). All this signals that Prayuth’s popularity is waning and serious cracks are beginning to emerge in the multi-party coalition. Prayuth’s popularity rating fell to just 18% in September, down from 29% in March (Nikkei Asia 2021b). And there is constant talk of the biggest coalition partners, the Democrat Party and Bhumjaithai (Thai Pride) Party, leaving the governing coalition.

The largest opposition party, Pheu Thai, continues to suffer from internal discord. At the end of 2020 there were major defections from the party, including one of its founders, Sudarat Keyuraphan. Sudarat formed the Thai Sang Thai (Thais Build Thais) Party, but with rumors surfacing in October of the Constitutional Court dissolving Pheu Thai, Sudarat’s party could become the major political vehicle in the next elections (Bangkok Post 2020). Pheu Thai still remains popular in the north and northeast (Bangkok Post 2021d), but there is growing debate about the role of the Shinawatra family in the party. As talk of fresh polls surfaced toward the end of the year, Pheu Thai named Thaksin’s daughter, Paetongtarn, as an adviser to the party, which some people saw as paving the way for her to take up the party’s leadership reins. Some within the party see such a move as undermining the party’s policy credentials (Straits Times 2021).

The reversion to the 1997 electoral rules could provide incentives for Pheu Thai to regroup. But it might also signal its removal from the national party list. The Move Forward Party, which has sent a clear and consistent message to the public about the role of the military and reform of the political system, has gained in popularity in polls. Despite its founding leader, Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, being banned from politics, a Suan Dusit poll in October named his replacement, Pita Limjaroenrat, as the most popular person for the role of prime minister. In the same poll Pheu Thai was expected to win the most seats, but it was party defector Sudarat Keyuraphan who topped the poll of Thaksin-aligned party leaders (Thaiger 2021).

On the other side of the political divide, the battle between the Democrat Party and PPRP continues to rage. PPRP has gone to great lengths to establish its national policy chops, especially with its People’s Welfare Card (Selway 2020). This might shave more seats off the Democrat Party. But never write them off—they are Thailand’s longest-standing party and as shrewd as they come. If they play their cards right, they could win over some of the student protestors in one of their traditional strongholds, Bangkok. Moving with the opposition on charter amendments may be one way the Democrat Party is starting to distance itself from PPRP.

Thailand’s weak human rights record since the beginning of the student-led protests in 2020 has increasingly put the country at odds with its traditional international partners, most notably the United States. In response to such criticism, pro-monarchy groups have even accused the US of waging a “hybrid war” against Thailand by covertly funding the protestors (Bangkok Post 2021c).

However, the US is placing Thailand in a more precarious international situation as US–China tensions heat up. The formation of a security alliance between the US, UK, and Australia (AUKUS) has put Thailand in a difficult situation with China, a country with which it has enjoyed improved relations in the past two decades. With China not willing to criticize Thailand’s human rights situation, Prayuth has yet to accept US president Joe Biden’s invitation to visit the White House (Thai PBS 2021b). Thailand also failed to appear in the allies section of the Biden administration’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, published in March (Rand Corporation 2021).

While ties between the Thai military and the Chinese government have warmed since the 2014 coup, as shown by increased military purchases from China, there is wariness regarding Chinese influence in the country. In 2016 Prayuth briefly canceled a Belt and Road Initiative project which would connect China to Thailand by high-speed rail (Zawacki 2021).

Reluctant to sit on the sidelines as a victim in this power struggle, Thailand has been reaching out to the European Union as a “third country” to hedge against the uncertainties of the US–China rivalry. The US is Thailand’s largest trading partner, while China is its second-largest foreign investor (after Japan) and its largest source of tourists. Thailand has been reaching out further to the EU on all these fronts, but most notably a free-trade pact with the EU was discussed by the Thai cabinet in September. Official talks are expected to begin before the end of the year (Deutsche Welle 2021).

As of August 2021, Thailand’s COVID-19 surge was driven primarily by the Alpha variant (Thanat et al. 2021). As the more deadly Delta variant begins to take over, it is being met with increasing, but still inadequate, vaccination rates. The Thai government has survived two no-confidence motions in parliament over its handling of the pandemic, but if things get worse it may not survive a third. The Prayuth government continues to pit itself against the people; how many more months of street protests it can absorb from the mostly middle-class students is unclear. The government’s legitimacy is weakening in the periphery, too. Anti-government protests have taken place in virtually every province of the country.

However, student protestors aren’t the only actors responding to government ineffectiveness. Civil society has become more lively over the past year, and a proposed bill to give the government power to arbitrarily rein in civic groups represents a ticking time bomb. Can the voice of the people restore democracy before that happens?

If Prayuth can personally stomach such dissent, it is not clear his supporters can. Cracks are beginning to emerge in the fragile multi-party coalition, and the major parties in previous elections are enthusiastic about competing under the familiar electoral system of the 1997 constitution (Termsak 2021). Perhaps even more importantly, senior figures in the armed forces seem to be impatient with Prayuth’s inability to bring about stability. Following Prayuth’s defeat of the no-confidence motion in September, rumors of another coup increased, with Prayuth stating that he could not determine whether “there will be a coup or there won’t be a coup” and adding that “no one wants to do it, no one wants to stage one.” Political scientist Paul Chambers (2021) writes that the military will not hesitate to stage a coup if its vested interests are threatened by the student protestors. So, fresh elections, coup, or both? The coming year (2022) promises a huge step either toward democracy or even further back, to authoritarianism.

Published online: February 9, 2022