By exploring the composition of the Chinese Communisty Party’s Central Committee since the 1990s, we analyze why state-owned enterprises reform has fallen into a partial reform equilibrium. We argue that two hypotheses, the interest group hypothesis and the adaptive power-sharing hypothesis, should be combined to fully comprehend the partial reform equilibrium symptom.
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Research Article| June 01 2017
The Political Logic of Partial Reform of China’s State-Owned Enterprises
Asian Survey (2017) 57 (3): 395–415.
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Jun Zhang, Qi Zhang, Zhikuo Liu; The Political Logic of Partial Reform of China’s State-Owned Enterprises. Asian Survey 1 June 2017; 57 (3): 395–415. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2017.57.3.395
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